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ABSTRACT
The mirror-image theory of cooperative state enforcement of
federal immigration law is a phenomenon—one of the most wildly
successful legal ideas in decades. The mirror-image theory proposes
that states can enact and enforce criminal immigration laws that are
based on federal statutes. The theory that it is unobjectionable for a
state to carry out federal policy is the basis of Arizona’s Support Our
Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act—better known as SB
1070—and similar laws enacted in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, and
Utah. The same theory has provoked the introduction of bills in
numerous other states and earlier but more narrowly focused
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immigration laws already in force in seven states. The mirror-image
theory has succeeded not only in legislatures but also in the larger
political culture: it has been embraced by dozens of U.S. senators and
representatives, by policy groups, by private citizens, and by
commentators including George Will, Sarah Palin, and the editors of
the New York Post and the Washington Times.
The mirror-image theory is indeed appealing. But it is also
fundamentally flawed. This Article, the first to subject the mirrorimage theory to sustained scholarly scrutiny, demonstrates that the
mirror-image theory fails to identify a legitimate source of state
authority to legislate on immigration matters.
No one denies that Congress and the federal executive have
exclusive authority over the substance and procedure of the
admission, exclusion, and removal of noncitizens, documented and
undocumented. This proposition was firmly established by a pair of
Supreme Court decisions from 1876. The mirror-image theory does
not challenge this deep-rooted idea head-on, but instead proposes that
state legislative authority over immigration flows from federal cases
and the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act that
authorize states to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration
law. Those sources, however, contemplate state assistance with
enforcement only through arrests, and arrest authority does not imply
the power to legislate or to prosecute. To the contrary, other
provisions of the INA clarify that federal agencies have the exclusive
power to make prosecutorial and administrative decisions after an
arrest, as well as to create supplementary regulations.
The mirror-image theory rests on the erroneous premise that
Congress has implicitly authorized state enforcement of federal
immigration law. This Article argues that state enforcement would be
unconstitutional even if it were explicitly authorized by Congress.
First, the federal immigration power is exclusive and nondelegable.
Second, criminal prosecution and immigration enforcement are
executive powers that Congress cannot remove from the president and
share with non-executive-branch officials. Finally, the Supreme Court
has held that states cannot prosecute crimes that affect only the
sovereign interests of the United States. Accordingly, state
immigration prosecutions are irremediably unconstitutional.
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INTRODUCTION
The mirror-image theory of cooperative state enforcement of
federal immigration law is one of the most consequential legal ideas
in decades. The theory proposes that states can help carry out federal
immigration policy by enacting and enforcing state laws that mirror
federal statutes. The mirror-image theory provided the legal
foundation for Arizona’s controversial and sweeping Support Our
Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act—better known as SB
1
1070 —and copycat bills with similarly broad scopes have been

1. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess.
Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, 41), as
amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070; see also id. § 1 (“The
legislature finds that there is a compelling interest in the cooperative enforcement of federal
immigration laws throughout all of Arizona.”); Kirk Adams, Op-Ed., The Truth Behind
Arizona’s Immigration Law, WASH. POST, May 28, 2010, at A23 (“[A]s signed, S.B. 1070
mirrors federal law by making it a state crime to be in this country illegally, as has been the case
in federal statute for decades.”). A federal judge preliminarily enjoined some portions of SB
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approved by the legislatures of other states : Utah’s law passed in
4
5
6
March 2011, Georgia’s and Indiana’s in May 2011, and Alabama’s
7
in June 2011. Similar though more limited laws are already on the

1070, but the mirror-image provisions based on federal law were not enjoined. United States v.
Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002–04 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011).
2. Bills patterned on SB 1070 include the Florida Immigration Enforcement Act of 2010,
H.R. 1C, 2010 Leg., Spec. Sess. C (Fla. 2010); the In Support of Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act, H.R. 8142, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2010); the Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, H.R. 3830, 2010 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2010); the
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, H.R. 2479, 2010 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010); S. 1303, 60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010); and the Arkansas Taxpayer
and Citizen Protection Act of 2009, H.R 1093, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009). For
an overview of these bills, see Anna Gorman, Ariz. Law Is Just One of Many, L.A. TIMES, July
17, 2010, at A1. For a discussion of the legal and political issues facing these copycat laws, see
SB 1070’s Copycats See Trouble Now, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Jan. 29, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://
azstarnet.com/article_e50bae95-abbf-5f1a-b7a0-6973f43261a5.html.
3. Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, ch. 21, 2011 Ut. ALS 21 (Utah 2011) (LEXIS)
(to be codified in scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN. tits. 76, 77), as amended by Act of
Mar. 15, 2011, ch. 18, 2011 Ut. ALS 18 (Utah) (LEXIS).
4. Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, No. 252, 2011 Ga. ALS 252
(Ga.) (LEXIS) (to be codified in scattered sections of GA. CODE ANN. tits. 13, 16, 17, 35, 36, 42,
45, 50). This statute was enjoined in Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, No.
1:11-CV-1804-TWT, 2011 WL 2520752 (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2011).
5. Act of May 5, 2011, Pub. L. No. 171, 2011 Ind. ALS 171 (Ind.) (LEXIS) (to be codified
in scattered sections of IND. CODE. tits. 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 22, 34, 35). This statute was enjoined in
Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:11-cv-708-SEB-MJD, 2011 WL 2532935 (S.D. Ind. June 24,
2011).
6. Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, Pub. Act No. 535,
2011 Al. ALS 535 (Ala. 2011) (LEXIS). This statute was partially enjoined in United States v.
Alabama, No. 2:11-CV-2746-SLB, 2011 WL 4469941 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011). It has generated
substantial media attention. See, e.g., Gigi Douban, Police Knock Alabama’s New Immigration
(July
6,
2011),
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/
Law,
MARKETPLACE
web/2011/07/06/pm-resistance-shown-against-alabamas-immigration-law
(describing
how
Alabama sheriffs questioned the wisdom and enforceability of the tough immigration law in
light of the sheriffs’ good relations with immigrant workers, their limited police resources, and
their other crime priorities); Eyder Peralta, Friends and Foes Call Alabama’s Immigration Law
the Nation’s Toughest, THE TWO-WAY: NPR’S NEWS BLOG (June 10, 2011, 2:09 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/06/10/137107117/friends-and-foes-call-alabamasimmigration-law-the-nations-toughest (“I’m proud of the [Alabama] Legislature for working
tirelessly to create the strongest immigration bill in the country.” (quoting Alabama Governor
Robert Bentley) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
7. In basic outline, SB 1070 does four things: it 1) creates new state-level immigrationrelated crimes, such as working in the state without authorization, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132928 (Supp. 2011), and failing to carry an immigration document, id. § 13-1509; 2) allows police
to arrest those who are suspected of being removable from the United States, id. § 133883(A)(5); 3) requires police, under pain of lawsuit, to investigate the immigration status of
those lawfully stopped, detained, or arrested if they are suspected of being in the state without
authorization, id. § 11-1051(B); and 4) prohibits restrictions on the immigration-enforcement
activities of public employees, id. § 11-1051(A). For a discussion of SB 1070, see generally
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books in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Oklahoma, Missouri,
13
14
South Carolina, and Utah.
Although the mirror-image theory is said to be a variant of the
idea of cooperative enforcement, it is actually more like an evil twin.
Cooperative enforcement is a familiar idea throughout our federal
system and a pervasive concept in American criminal justice.
Whether the subject is the environment, health and safety, business
regulation, or crime, the essential premise of cooperative
enforcement is that the federal and state governments are either
affirmatively working together or working in tandem, and that they
do so under either explicit federal authority or independent state
authority. The recent immigration laws that legislatures justify under
the mirror-image theory, however, do not reflect cooperation with the
federal government. In fact, they reflect just the opposite: they are an
explicit rejection of the federal government’s objectives and means.
Nonetheless, the mirror-image theory is one of the few technical
legal concepts to gain currency far beyond the legal academy and
legislatures. Championed principally by then-Professor Kris
15
Kobach, the idea that states can pass immigration laws based on

Gabriel J. Chin, Carissa Byrne Hessick, Toni Massaro & Marc L. Miller, A Legal Labyrinth:
Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010).
8. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2319 (Supp. 2011) (making it a class 2, class 3, or class
4 felony to “intentionally engage in the smuggling of human beings for profit” and permitting
peace officers to lawfully stop any motor-vehicle operator who they reasonably suspect to be
violating any traffic law). This statute was upheld in State v. Flores, 188 P.3d 706 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2008).
9. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-13-128 (2011) (making it a class 3 felony to smuggle immigrants
for the purpose of assisting illegal entry into Colorado).
10. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.07 (West Supp. 2011) (making transporting an illegal immigrant
into the United States a first-degree misdemeanor).
11. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 446 (Supp. 2010) (barring both the transporting and concealing
of illegal immigrants within the state of Oklahoma).
12. MO. ANN. STAT. § 577.675 (West 2011) (making it unlawful to knowingly transport an
illegal alien in the state of Missouri for the purposes of human trafficking, drug trafficking, or
prostitution).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-460 (Supp. 2010) (making it a felony punishable by fine or
imprisonment to transport or shelter an illegal immigrant).
14. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-2901 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (making it unlawful to
transport or conceal an illegal immigrant with the intent to violate federal immigration law).
15. Professor Kobach previously worked as a lawyer for the U.S. Department of Justice
and as a professor of law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City before his election as the
secretary of state of Kansas in 2010.
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federal standards has achieved astonishing acceptance in the general
17
political culture, among columnists and commentators,
on
18
among U.S. senators and
newspaper editorial boards,
19
20
representatives, and in policy groups. The idea has also succeeded
16. See Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal
Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 157–62 (2008) [hereinafter Kobach, Attrition]
(describing how state laws may encourage self-deportation); Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the
Rule of Law: What States Can and Should Do To Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 459, 463–82 (2008) [hereinafter Kobach, Reinforcing] (outlining steps that states can take to
affect immigration). An unsigned student note from 1954—a time when an author and journal
could use the term “wetback” in the title of an article without irony or embarrassment—makes
a similar argument. See Note, Wetbacks: Can the States Act To Curb Illegal Entry?, 6 STAN. L.
REV. 287, 303–16 (1954) (arguing that state actions against illegal immigrants should be
permissible).
17. See, e.g., George F. Will, Op-Ed., A Law Arizona Can Live with, WASH. POST, Apr. 28,
2010, at A21 (“Arizona’s law makes what is already a federal offense—being in the country
illegally—a state offense. Some critics seem not to understand Arizona’s right to assert
concurrent jurisdiction.”); John G. Browning, Legally Speaking: Federal Preemption—But Only
When It Suits Us, SOUTHEAST TEX. REC. (July 20, 2010, 5:47 PM), http://www.setexasrecord
.com/arguments/228319-legally-speaking-federal-preemption----but-only-when-it-suits-us (“First
of all, Arizona’s S.B. 1070 . . . mirrors longstanding federal immigration law; it’s intended to
complement, not contradict, immigration policy.”); Hannity (Fox News television program Apr.
27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,591654,00.html)
(“Because, again, this law in Arizona that has recently been signed, it essentially replicates,
duplicates the federal law anyway. So I don’t know why Obama has a problem with
that . . . .” (quoting Sarah Palin)); Rush Limbaugh, Judge Rips Guts out of AZ Law: It’s No
Longer Illegal To Be Illegal, THE RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW (July 28, 2010), http://www.rush
limbaugh.com/daily/2010/07/28/judge_rips_guts_out_of_az_law_it_s_no_longer_illegal_to_be_
illegal (“The Arizona law mirrors the federal law.”); David A. Patten, Experts: ‘Ridiculous’
Lawsuit Won’t Nix Arizona Law on Illegals, NEWSMAX.COM (July 6, 2010, 8:05 PM), http://
www.newsmax.com/Headline/arizona-lawsuit-illegals-obama/2010/07/06/id/363929 (“Arizona’s
law is designed to help federal immigration authorities enforce their own laws against illegals—
statutes that the feds have largely ignored. The Arizona law, S.B. 1070, was crafted carefully to
mimic federal laws on the books precisely to avoid a lawsuit based on federal supremacy.”);
Edward Sifuentes, Three USD Professors Say Arizona Law Is Constitutional, N. COUNTY TIMES
(May 13, 2010, 7:44 PM), http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/sdcounty/article_9631a761-1a36597b-8467-2173655b4465.html (“Professor Lawrence Alexander, who teaches constitutional law
at USD, said that [the constitutional] argument would fail because the Arizona law does not
conflict with federal immigration law.”). Although the mirror-image idea has been developed in
the context of immigration law, there is no logical reason that it can apply only in the
immigration field.
18. See, e.g., Editorial, A Contemptible Suit, N.Y. POST, July 8, 2010, at 24 (“Arizona’s
statute, after all, essentially mirrors existing federal law . . . .”); Editorial, Judicial Activism
Against Arizona, WASH. TIMES, July 29, 2010, at B02 (“However, the case at hand doesn’t deal
with pre-emptive law but with parallel enforcement. Arizona’s law does not define who has
broken immigration laws; it deals with what to do when police apprehend these criminals.”).
19. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, Members of the United States Congress Trent Franks
et al. at 5, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10-CV-01413SRB), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In encouraging cooperative enforcement of
immigration law, Congress did not displace State and local enforcement activity.”); id. at 10
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on a rhetorical and popular level, with ordinary citizens asking how
the federal government can complain that its own laws are actually
21
being enforced. Some parts of SB 1070 were preliminarily enjoined
by the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona in a decision
that was later affirmed by a panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. To some extent, however, the district
court’s decision can be read as an affirmation of the mirror-image
22
theory because of the parts of the Arizona law it did not enjoin.
The mirror-image idea, however popular, represents a
fundamental legal and policy shift. The idea that states can
independently enforce federal and state criminal immigration
provisions that deal directly with immigration is inconsistent with
immigration jurisprudence, law, and policy. SB 1070 and its siblings
offer states an entirely new level of autonomy and discretion. The
creation of new state crimes allows states to prosecute aliens for
(“Congress has continuously encouraged states to assist in enforcing federal immigration law.
S.B. 1070 is consistent with that intent.”); Hannity (Fox News television program July 23, 2010)
(transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,597704,00.html) (“[W]e know that
the law was written in order to mirror federal law and not to go expand beyond the limits of
federal law.” (quoting Congressman Steve King)).
20. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Defending Arizona, NAT’L REV., June 7, 2010, at 31, 33
(“Indeed, S.B. 1070 is a mirror image of federal law. The documentation provisions of the
Arizona law penalize precisely the same conduct that is already penalized under federal
immigration law . . . .”); Steven A. Camarota, Center for Immigration Studies on the New
Arizona Immigration Law, SB1070, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Apr. 29, 2010), http://cis
.org/Announcement/AZ-Immigration-SB1070 (“The law is designed to avoid the legal pitfall of
‘pre-emption,’ which means a state can’t adopt laws that conflict with federal laws. By making
what is a federal violation also a state violation, the Arizona law avoids this problem.”).
21. P. Anderson, Federal Government’s Lawsuit Wrong, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (July 7, 2010,
12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/opinions/articles/2010/07/07/20100707wed
lets072.html (“The federal government is suing the state of Arizona for passing a law that will
enforce immigration laws the federal government passed but refuses to enforce. No wonder our
federal government has such a low approval rating.”); Jimmie R. Applegate, Reader Offers
More Perspective on Immigration Laws, CHINOOK OBSERVER, July 6, 2010, http://www.chinook
observer.com/opinion/letter-reader-offers-more-perspective-on-immigration-laws/article_3344
9881-2188-5fa1-ac06-0cbafe7ed918.html (“SB 1070 is the mirror image of US federal law that
unfortunately has not been enforced by federal officials.”).
22. See Michel Hethmon, Arizona Can Prevail on Immigration Law, CNN (July 30, 2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-30/opinion/hethmon.arizona.ruling_1_immigration-lawimmigration-status-rampant-immigration (“Notably, [the district court judge] tossed [the] farleft theor[y] advanced by U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder . . . . that the Arizona criminal
‘mirror’ statutes were a pre-empted ‘regulation of immigration,’ the theory used to sabotage
California’s Proposition 187 back in 1996.”). In declining to enjoin particular provisions of the
law, the court concluded that SB 1070 “does not attempt to prohibit entry into Arizona, but
rather criminalizes specific conduct already prohibited by federal law.” Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d
at 1003 n.19. According to the court, the law “creates parallel state statutory provisions for
conduct already prohibited by federal law.” Id. at 1003.
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offenses related to their status under state laws, without the
permission or the cooperation of the federal government. Through
this newfound power, states can create and carry out their own
immigration-enforcement policies—using their own officers,
proceeding in their own courts, and imposing their own punishments,
including imprisonment in state prisons. The explicit purposes of SB
1070 and its copycats are to “make attrition through enforcement the
public policy” of the state and to “discourage and deter the unlawful
entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons
23
unlawfully present in the United States.” As proponents of SB 1070
and its imitators often explain, their hope is that illegal immigrants
24
will “self-deport.”
At first blush, the unconstitutionality of these laws seems nearly
certain. As Part I explains, the Supreme Court has held that the
“[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a
25
federal power.” That power is “vested solely in the Federal
Government, rather than the States” and is “of a political
26
character,” leaving little room for innovation by other levels of
government.
A plain reading of a long line of Supreme Court cases suggests
that states have no intrinsic sovereign authority to impose criminal
sanctions for what they regard as misconduct involving immigration,
nor do they have the authority to induce the self-deportation of
noncitizens they deem undesirable. No proponent of SB 1070 or any
27
other cooperative-enforcement measure has claimed otherwise. This
is, therefore, not a classic states’ rights issue, in that Arizona and the
other states do not claim inherent authority under the federal

23. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, § 1, 2010 Ariz.
Sess. Laws 450, 450.
24. E.g., Kobach, Attrition, supra note 16, at 157–62.
25. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976), superseded by statute, Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 101, § 274A(h)(2), 100 Stat. 3359, 3368, as
recognized in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). This
principle is discussed in detail in Part I.A, infra.
26. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976).
27. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, Members of the United States Congress Trent Franks
et al., supra note 19, at 10 (“Congress has plenary authority to regulate aliens.”); Proposed Brief
of Amici Curiae Michigan et al. at 2, Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (No. 2:10-CV-01413-SRB)
(“This Court must presume that S.B. 1070 is not preempted, unless (1) the statute constitutes a
‘regulation of immigration’ . . . .” (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355)); Kobach, Reinforcing,
supra note 16, at 464 (“[I]mmigration is a field in which the federal government enjoys plenary
authority under Article I of the U.S. Constitution . . . .”).
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Constitution —through the Tenth Amendment or otherwise —to
regulate immigration and to decide who should be allowed to enter
the country and who should be removed.
But proponents of SB 1070 and similar laws claim to have
squared the circle. They claim that the mirror-image theory provides
a legal basis for states to enact criminal laws addressing
30
undocumented immigration
as a matter of cooperative
31
enforcement. States may not regulate immigration under their own
sovereign authority; nevertheless, the argument goes, so long as state
laws are nearly identical to federal laws, states have the power to
enact them.
As with many of the legal issues raised by SB 1070, the question
of the legitimacy of state action in support of immigration is
complicated. But the complexity of an issue does not mean that it has
no definitive answer. A close analysis of the cases and authorities on
which the mirror-image and cooperative-enforcement theories rest
shows that the theories are neither based on existing law nor on a
modest change, but rather represent a dramatic expansion of state
authority that is inconsistent with existing constitutional doctrine.
Part I briefly reviews the constitutional text and other legal
authority that recognizes exclusive federal control over immigration
policy. Saying that federal control is exclusive does not on its own
answer the question of whether states can play any role in
immigration enforcement—they can and do—or whether states can

28. But see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26, Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182
(U.S. Aug. 10, 2011) (“States enjoy plenary power and state law enforcement officers do not
require authorization from the federal Congress.”).
29. In addition, unlike opponents of school desegregation, who rested their arguments on
states’ rights, defenders of SB 1070’s legality contend that the law is consistent with the
Constitution and with Supreme Court rulings, not that the states have no obligation to follow
federal law as set out by the federal courts. For an account of another legal movement—not
entirely unrelated—designed to expand state authority at the expense of the federal
government, see Barak Y. Orbach, Kathleen S. Callahan & Lisa M. Lindemenn, Arming States’
Rights: Federalism, Private Lawmakers, and the Battering Ram Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161,
1171–83 (2010).
30. Kobach, Reinforcing, supra note 16, at 475.
31. E.g., Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1,
Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (No. 2:10-CV-01413-SRB) (“The Arizona Legislature enacted SB
1070 primarily to require that Arizona’s law enforcement officers cooperate in the enforcement
of federal immigration laws and, pursuant to the State’s broad police powers, to establish state
crimes that mirror existing federal laws.”); Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae Michigan et al.,
supra note 27, at 1 (“Like Arizona, the State of Michigan and the amici States have the power to
concurrently enforce Federal immigration law . . . .”).
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enact laws incidentally impacting immigration policy—they can. But
the recognition that immigration is one of the clearest areas of sole
federal authority—along with other matters such as national security
32
and the creation of a single currency —raises the question of whether
states can identify either a federal foundation or some other
33
constitutional authority for their immigration laws and policies.
Part II explores the cases and statutes on which the claim of
authority for state cooperative enforcement rests. Although both
34
federal case law and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
recognize a state role in federal immigration enforcement, these
authorities contemplate state cooperation with federal authorities and
state authority to arrest—not independent state criminal prosecution,
criminalization, or punishment.
The distinction between arrest on the one hand and
criminalization and prosecution on the other is critical. Arrests leave
discretionary decisions in the hands of the federal authorities. Even
after an independent state decision to arrest, a suspect is handed over
to federal authorities who decide how to proceed. Under the INA,
federal authorities can still decide whether to proceed with a
prosecution, use a civil remedy, or grant some form of relief or visa to
which the noncitizen is entitled under the law. The discretion inherent
in the federal immigration regime, and in federal criminal
enforcement more generally—the power to charge or not, to decide
what to charge, and to choose whether to pursue civil or
administrative measures—is as much a part of the law of immigration
as the relevant statutory text.
States are free to support federal civil policies in various ways,
including hearing federal claims in state courts and passing
complementary civil laws. In the criminal context, the rule is reversed.
By Supreme Court decision and under federal statutes dating back to

32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16 (authorizing Congress “[t]o declare War,” maintain
and govern land and naval forces, and “provide for calling forth the Militia”); id. art. I, § 8, cls.
5–6 (providing Congress with the authority to “coin Money, regulate the Value thereof,” and
“provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting” such money).
33. Compare Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001) (noting “a presumption against
pre-emption in areas of traditional state regulation”), with Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (“Policing fraud against federal agencies is hardly ‘a field
which the States have traditionally occupied’ such as to warrant a presumption against finding
federal pre-emption of a state-law cause of action.” (citation omitted) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
34. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006).
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35

the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal crimes may be tried only in federal
courts.
Part III explores whether states could pass their own
immigration laws if expressly authorized by Congress. Although
states can unquestionably do a great deal to aid federal immigration
enforcement, Congress has no power to delegate regulatory authority
in areas within its exclusive jurisdiction. Further, Congress has no
power to delegate the president’s duty to carry out the laws to state
officers who are wholly outside of presidential control. Accordingly,
even if Congress invited the states to legislate in the immigration
sphere, the resulting state laws would still be unconstitutional.
I. THE FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE IMMIGRATION
States interested in legislating in the immigration sphere face a
complex set of legal difficulties. Traditionally, regulation of
immigration has been a matter reserved for the federal government.
Yet not all state laws that affect immigration or immigrants are
automatically unconstitutional. Instead, the Supreme Court has
examined whether a given state law is aimed at a legitimate state
interest or whether it intends to regulate immigration itself. If a state
law is aimed at a legitimate state interest, the Court will examine
whether the law interferes or conflicts with federal measures and is,
therefore, preempted or unconstitutional.
According to its proponents, the principle of cooperative
enforcement of federal immigration law gives states room to legislate
36
within this constitutional structure. Cooperative enforcement is a
method for “state legislators to stem the flow of illegal immigration
37
into their respective jurisdictions.” In an article that serves as a
playbook for legislators seeking to persuade undocumented citizens
to self-deport, Kobach explains:

35. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
36. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Op-Ed., Why Arizona Drew a Line, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2010, at A31 (“While it is true that Washington holds primary authority in immigration, the
Supreme Court since 1976 has recognized that states may enact laws to discourage illegal
immigration without being pre-empted by federal law.”); Julia Preston, A Professor Fights
Illegal Immigration One Court at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10 (“To rigidly separate
local government from federal government when we think about immigration enforcement is
not only legally incorrect, it’s also bad policy . . . .” (quoting Kobach) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
37. Kobach, Reinforcing, supra note 16, at 463.
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The premise is a straightforward one—the way to solve America’s
illegal immigration problem is to make it more difficult for
unauthorized aliens to work illegally in the United States, while
incrementally stepping up the enforcement of other laws
discouraging illegal immigration. The result is that many illegal
38
aliens self-deport.

Kobach frankly recognizes that “state statutes must be carefully
39
drafted to avoid federal preemption.” Even within this cooperativeenforcement scheme, “[t]he federal crimes that are most suited to
duplication at the state level are alien smuggling and alien
40
harboring.” Statutes that establish those crimes impose felony
penalties on any person who, “knowing or in reckless disregard of the
fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United
States in violation of law,” either
transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move such alien
within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in
furtherance of such violation of law; [or]
conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal,
harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including
41
any building or any means of transportation . . . .

From a criminal-law perspective, this transportation provision is
42
recognizable as imposing accomplice liability. The law on first read
appears to be designed to suppress a particular act—transportation
“in furtherance” of the coming, entering, or remaining of noncitizens
in violation of the law. Similarly, the provision that prohibits
concealment, harboring, or shielding also punishes misprision of the

38. Id. at 472.
39. Id. at 464.
40. Id. at 475.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii) (2006).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006) (“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.”); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (1985) (“A person is an accomplice of another
person in the commission of an offense if: (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offense, he . . . (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in
planning or committing it.”); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2 (2d
ed. 2003) (describing the doctrine of accomplice liability).
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and imposes accomplice or

A. Federal Supremacy over Immigration
The Constitution makes the creation of state immigration crimes
a tricky proposition. Laws dealing with noncitizens are traditionally
divided into two branches. The first is immigration law, which
addresses which noncitizens can come to the United States and which
must stay out or leave. More specifically, immigration law defines the
procedures for admission and exclusion at the border, as well as the
procedure for removal—also known as deportation—from the
interior of the United States. The second branch is alienage law,
which describes the rights and burdens of noncitizens residing in the
United States. Although states have some authority with regard to
46
alienage law, they face a daunting burden when attempting to
regulate immigration. That is to say, as a rule of thumb, states have

43. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (“Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make
known the same . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”).
44. Id. § 3 (“Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been
committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his
apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.”).
45. Under the views of some courts, a person being transported may be liable for the
substantive offense of transportation as a conspirator or accomplice. See, e.g., State v. Flores,
188 P.3d 706, 709 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (finding a Mexican citizen guilty of solicitation to
commit human smuggling because he “solicited another person to smuggle him into the United
States, which would [have included] travel within Arizona”); State v. Barragan-Sierra, 196 P.3d
879, 885 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (“The language of the conspiracy and human smuggling statutes
in effect at the time of Appellant’s offense . . . plainly allow[s] the person smuggled to be
convicted of conspiracy to commit human smuggling.”).
46. State “classifications based on alienage,” the Court has said, “are inherently suspect
and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)
(invalidating an Arizona law that restricted legal aliens’ access to benefits). Thus, lawful
permanent residents and other noncitizens allowed into the United States by law cannot be
denied most rights. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (holding that preventing
noncitizens from taking the bar exam violates equal protection). State authority is broader,
however, in areas related to core political functions. For example, states can deny even legally
admitted noncitizens the right to be peace officers, Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 445–
47 (1982), or school teachers, Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80–81 (1979). Older case law,
now controversial in the state courts, holds that lawful aliens may be prohibited from owning
firearms. See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Federal
Power, and the Second Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891 (2007) (reviewing the restrictions on
noncitizens’ right to bear arms due to equal protection norms and the federal foreign-affairs
power).
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some limited direct power to regulate immigrants, but no direct
47
power to regulate immigration.
Federal control over immigration is granted by the Constitution’s
provisions that explicitly authorize Congress to regulate interstate
48
49
commerce, to establish “an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” and
50
to conduct foreign affairs. Because noncitizens, by definition, come
from other countries, the Court has recognized that their treatment
implicates foreign affairs, which is also an exclusively federal political
51
power. Accordingly, as a general rule, “federal power over aliens is

47. The coherence of the current regime is not without critics. See, e.g., Clare Huntington,
The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792 (2008)
(“[T]he constitutional mandate for federal exclusivity over pure immigration law is far more
contestable than the traditional debate would suggest.”). Few, however, dispute its existence at
a basic level. For an examination of the preemption of state criminal immigration laws, see, for
example, Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 939, 984–86 (1995); Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal” Immigrants
Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 29–39 (2007); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local
Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 27; Mark S. Grube, Note, Preemption of Local Regulations Beyond Lozano v. City of
Hazleton: Reconciling Local Enforcement with Federal Immigration Policy, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 391 (2010); and Ben Meade, Note, Interstate Instability: Why Colorado’s Alien Smuggling
Statute Is Preempted by Federal Immigration Laws, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 237 (2008). Note,
however, that the Arizona Court of Appeals has upheld one of the state’s mirror-image
immigration laws. See supra note 8.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)
(“Congress [has] the power to pass a law regulating immigration as a part of commerce of this
country with foreign nations . . . .”).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The power is also recognized by implication in Article V,
which prohibited, until 1808, amendment of the provision of Article I that denies Congress the
authority to prohibit the “Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now
existing shall think proper to admit,” id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. That is, but for the prohibition before
1808, Congress may prohibit the migration or importation of certain persons.
50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations”); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (holding that federal authority to
regulate the status of aliens arises out of the constitutional power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, the broad authority over foreign affairs, and the power to establish a uniform
rule of naturalization). Because the foreign-affairs power is at least partly in the hands of the
president, some authority exists for the notion that the president has some inherent power in the
immigration context. See infra Part III.B.
51. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1164 (2009) (“Judicial deference in the
immigration context is of special importance, for executive officials ‘exercise especially sensitive
political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’ The Attorney General’s
decision . . . ‘may affect our relations with [the alien’s native] country or its neighbors. The
judiciary is not well positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood
and importance of such diplomatic repercussions.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425
(1999))); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“Our cases ‘have long recognized the power to
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exclusive and supreme in matters of their deportation and entry into
52
the United States.”
In addition to the fact that regulating immigration is an
important federal power, the states are largely disabled in the field.
The familiar and fundamental frameworks for assessing conflicts
between federal and state power are the Supremacy Clause of the
53
Constitution and the corresponding doctrine of preemption.
Preemption of state law comes in three forms: field preemption,
whereby federal authority implicitly occupies an entire area; express
congressional preemption by statute; and conflict preemption, which
occurs when state and federal laws impose conflicting duties,
54
especially when those conflicts are irreconcilable.
The long history of federal authority over naturalization and
immigration, along with the history of federal authority over foreign
55
affairs, provides a strong basis for a finding of field or conflict
preemption with regard to the regulation of immigration. The
foundational immigration cases were decided in 1876. Henderson v.
56
57
Mayor of New York and Chy Lung v. Freeman invalidated the
state immigration regimes of California, Louisiana, and New York
that operated before passage of the first general federal immigration

expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s
political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” (quoting Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953))); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to
do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control
the foreign affairs of the nation. When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the
admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implementing an
inherent executive power.” (citations omitted)).
52. State v. Camargo, 537 P.2d 920, 922 (Ariz. 1975).
53. Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
54. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality opinion).
55. The Constitution grants the federal government the power to “establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and to “regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
56. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876).
57. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876).

CHIN IN PRINTER PROOF

266

10/13/2011 9:46:53 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:251

58

laws. The statutes at issue required masters of vessels to post bonds
or pay fees when landing passengers. These funds were designed “to
protect . . . cities and towns from the expense of supporting persons
who are paupers or diseased, or helpless women and children, coming
59
from foreign countries.”
In finding the laws invalid, the Court made it clear that the
problem with state immigration regulation was not simply that such
regulation was preempted by federal law, but was instead something
more fundamental. The Henderson Court recognized that there might
be “a kind of neutral ground, especially in that covered by the
regulation of commerce, which may be occupied by the State, and its
legislation be valid so long as it interferes with no act of Congress, or
60
treaty of the United States.” But some matters, the Court stated, are
61
“of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.”
According to the Henderson Court’s reasoning, immigration
“belongs to that class of laws which concern the exterior relation of
62
this whole nation with other nations and governments,” and which
63
therefore “must of necessity be national in its character.” As the
Court explained, “The laws which govern the right to land passengers
in the United States . . . ought to be the same in New York, Boston,
64
New Orleans, and San Francisco.” Accordingly, “if there be a class
of laws which may be valid when passed by the States until the same
ground is occupied by a treaty or an act of Congress, this statute is not
65
of that class.”
In addition, the Henderson Court rejected the claim that the
challenged immigration rules were within the police power of the
state. Although the Court recognized that the states had a police
power, it nevertheless asserted that
no definition of it, and no urgency for its use, can authorize a State
to exercise it in regard to a subject-matter which has been confided
exclusively to the discretion of Congress by the Constitution.
58. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993) (reviewing immigration law in the United States
before the passage of a general federal immigration law).
59. Henderson, 92 U.S. at 268.
60. Id. at 272.
61. Id. at 273.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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....
. . . [W]henever the statute of a State invades the domain of
legislation which belongs exclusively to the Congress of the United
States, it is void, no matter under what class of powers it may fall, or
66
how closely allied to powers conceded to belong to the States.

In Chy Lung v. Freeman, the Court emphasized at greater length
the foreign-policy and national-security dangers presented by
allowing the states to have a discretionary enforcement role in the
area of immigration. Chy Lung dealt with a California statute aimed
at restricting Chinese immigration, a significant domestic and
international political issue at the time. The Court recognized that “a
silly, an obstinate, or a wicked [state immigration] commissioner may
bring disgrace upon the whole country, the enmity of a powerful
67
nation, or the loss of an equally powerful friend”; “if citizens of our
own government were treated by any foreign nation as subjects of the
Emperor of China have been actually treated under this law, no
administration could withstand the call for a demand on such
68
government for redress.” The Court was concerned that if California
“should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or to suspension
69
of intercourse,” not just California but “all the Union” would suffer.
The Court concluded that Congress “has the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the character of
those regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs
solely to the national government. If it be otherwise, a single State
can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other
70
nations.”
66. Id. at 271–72.
67. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1876).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 280. Other state actions with foreign-policy implications have met a similar
judicial reception. In Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), the Court invalidated an Oregon
probate law that made the right of an overseas heir to inherit property dependent on the
property laws of that heir’s nation. Id. at 430–31. The Court held that a state law is not invalid
simply because it has “some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.” Id. at 434
(quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, it found excessive “state involvement in foreign affairs and international
relations—matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government”—
unacceptable. Id. at 436. “As one reads the Oregon decisions, it seems that foreign policy
attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the ‘cold war,’ and the like are the real desiderata. Yet they
of course are matters for the Federal Government, not for local probate courts.” Id. at 437–38
(footnote omitted); see also Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 454 (1979)
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Chy Lung and Henderson established a jurisprudential
framework under which, as the Court later put it, “[c]ontrol over
immigration and naturalization is entrusted exclusively to the Federal
71
Government, and a State has no power to interfere.” This
framework has three critical features. First, states’ inability to pass
immigration legislation comes from a lack of authority, not mere
preemption by conflicting federal law. Second, the police power of
the states does not extend to regulating immigration. Third, both the
establishment of substantive immigration laws and the responsibility
“for the manner of their execution, belong[] solely to the national
72
government.”
These two decisions are so strong that, for more than 130 years,
few scholars or state legislatures, and virtually no courts, imagined
73
that states could develop their own immigration policies. Indeed,
Chy Lung and Henderson were decided before the first general
74
federal immigration laws.
That is, even when the federal

(invalidating a state tax on foreign containers as an impermissible local regulation of foreign
commerce and rejecting the argument “that a State is free to impose demonstrable burdens on
commerce, so long as Congress has not pre-empted the field by affirmative regulation”); Japan
Line, 441 U.S. at 457 (“The problems to which appellees refer are problems that admit only of a
federal remedy. They do not admit of a unilateral solution by a State.”).
71. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10 (1977); see also De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354
(1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”),
superseded by statute, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec.
101, § 274A(h)(2), 100 Stat. 3359, 3368, as recognized in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v.
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011); cf. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954,
964 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Courts have consistently struck down state laws which purport to regulate
an area of traditional state competence, but in fact, affect foreign affairs.”).
72. Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280.
73. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. Voorhies, 55 F.2d 310, 311–12 (E.D. Mich. 1931) (invalidating a
Michigan law that limited the employment of “[u]ndesirable aliens,” as defined by federal law,
“because it [sought] to usurp the power of government, exclusively vested by the Constitution in
Congress, over the control of aliens and immigration”); Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P.2d
645, 653 n.17 (Cal. 1969) (invalidating a statute that prohibited the employment of noncitizens
on public works and clarifying that “[t]o argue that the California statute [could] to [that] extent
control federal immigration decisions . . . defie[d] the constitutional grant of exclusive
congressional power to regulate immigration”); Ex parte Ah Cue, 35 P. 556, 557 (Cal. 1894)
(“Congress . . . has prescribed the terms upon which the Chinese now here shall be permitted to
remain within the United States; and it is beyond the power of the state to impose any further
conditions.”).
74. See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (“The Nation’s first 100
years was ‘a period of unimpeded immigration.’ . . . It was not until 1875 that Congress first
passed a statute barring convicts and prostitutes from entering the country, Act of Mar. 3, 1875,
ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477.” (quoting CHARLES GORDON & HARRY N. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.2a, at 5 (1959))); Neuman, supra note 58 (noting that no

CHIN IN PRINTER PROOF

2011]

10/13/2011 9:46:53 AM

STATE REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION

269

government did not regulate immigration at all, the states were still
prevented from doing so. Although the history of state-level antiimmigrant sentiment precedes and postdates Chy Lung and
Henderson, for most of that history, states avoided even the implicit
claim that they could craft their own general immigration law or
enforce federal immigration law in state courts.
B. State Regulation of Immigrants, Not Immigration
Despite states’ inability to regulate immigration, the Supreme
Court has consistently left room for some state action in the
treatment of undocumented noncitizens. The Court’s cases in this
area primarily address state responses aimed either at controlling
undesirable conduct by noncitizens or at protecting state activities
and functions, rather than responses aimed at regulating either
noncitizens’ presence in the state or the process of immigration itself.
75
In De Canas v. Bica, the Supreme Court held that California
could prohibit employers from hiring noncitizens who were not
authorized to work under federal law when employment would have
76
“an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.” Congress overruled
this specific holding by passing the Immigration Reform and Control
77
Act of 1986, which expressly preempts most civil and criminal state
78
laws related to the employment of noncitizens. But the general point
from De Canas remains valid: not “every state enactment which in
any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per
79
se preempted.”

comprehensive federal immigration legislation existed before 1875, although states had passed
their own regulations).
75. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), superseded by statute, Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 101, § 274A(h)(2), 100 Stat. 3359, 3368, as
recognized in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
76. Id. at 352, 365.
77. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 8, 18, 20, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
78. Id. sec. 101, § 274A(h)(2). In addition, no cases have interpreted the California law
since the Supreme Court’s decision. Therefore, it is unclear whether the decision operated as an
across-the-board employment ban or left open employment opportunities for which there was
little demand by employees authorized to work in the United States.
79. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355. The Equal Protection Clause also imposes some limits on
state power to regulate immigrants. In the 1976 decision in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976),
the Court held that the federal government could deny benefits to classes of noncitizens, id. at
69, even though it had decided in 1971 in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), that states
could not, id. at 382. The Mathews Court explained that the statute in Graham
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The decisive question is whether a particular measure is “a
regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determination of who
should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions
80
under which a legal entrant may remain.” Because the California
law was designed to “strengthen its economy by adopting federal
81
standards,” the Court held that it was valid. Although the Court
emphasized that the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is
82
unquestionably exclusively a federal power,” the mere fact that a
state law “has some purely speculative and indirect impact on
immigration” does not make it “a constitutionally proscribed
83
regulation of immigration.”
84
Additional important language comes from Plyler v. Doe, a
1982 decision. In that case, the Court held that undocumented
85
noncitizens were not a suspect class, but that states nonetheless
could not deny public education to undocumented K–12 students as a

encroach[ed] upon the exclusive federal power over the entrance and residence of
aliens. Of course, the latter ground of decision actually supports our holding today
that it is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than
that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry
and residence of aliens.
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84.
80. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 354.
83. Id. at 355–56. The Court noted that another California court had “said that ‘the section
[wa]s not aimed at immigration control or regulation but [sought] to aid California residents in
obtaining jobs . . . .’” Id. at 354 n.3 (omission in original) (quoting Dolores Canning Co. v.
Howard, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435, 442 (Ct. App. 1974)). Discounting speculative effects is not an
immigration-specific principle; in other areas, the Court has said that remote, speculative,
indirect, and incidental effects on federal authority or constitutional rights do not invalidate
state law. See, e.g., Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 395–96
(1983) (reaching a similar conclusion with respect to interstate commerce); O’Bannon v. Town
Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 787 (1980) (holding that although federal decertification of a
nursing home affected residents, it was “an indirect and incidental result of the Government’s
enforcement action [and did] not amount to a deprivation of any interest in life, liberty, or
property”); A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 43 (1934) (stating that even if a state tax
on a product diminished federal revenues, “the effect of it upon appellant would be so remote,
speculative and indirect as to afford appellant no basis for invoking the powers of a court of
equity”).
84. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
85. Id. at 223; see also Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80 (“[T]he fact that Congress has provided
some welfare benefits for citizens does not require it to provide like benefits for all aliens.
Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident
diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share in
the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some of its
guests.”).
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means of discouraging undocumented immigration. Plyler did not
formally impact state power to regulate immigration because the
Court specifically reserved the claim that the state law was
87
preempted and instead decided the case on equal protection
grounds. Nevertheless, the decision contained interesting dicta,
which, in isolation, can be read to support the mirror-image theory.
The Plyler Court noted that “undocumented status, coupled with
some articulable federal policy, might enhance state authority with
88
respect to the treatment of undocumented aliens.” Texas, the state
whose statute was being challenged, claimed that it could “protect
89
itself from an influx of illegal immigrants.” The Court agreed that a
state “might have an interest in mitigating the potentially harsh
90
economic effects of sudden shifts in population.” Although it
maintained that a state “has no direct interest in controlling entry into
this country, that interest being one reserved by the Constitution to
the Federal Government,” the Court recognized that “unchecked
unlawful migration might impair the State’s economy generally, or
91
the State’s ability to provide some important service.” Accordingly,
“[d]espite the exclusive federal control of this Nation’s borders,” the
Court refused to “conclude that the States are without any power to
deter the influx of persons entering the United States against federal
law” when those “numbers might have a discernable impact on
92
traditional state concerns.”
The Court concluded: “As we
recognized in De Canas v. Bica, the States do have some authority to

86. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (“If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the
free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must
be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. No such showing was
made here.”).
87. Id. at 210 n.8.
88. Id. at 226.
89. Id. at 228.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 228 n.23.
92. Id. (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354–56 (1976), superseded by statute,
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 101, § 274A(h)(2), 100
Stat. 3359, 3368, as recognized in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968
(2011)). Of course, the multiple layers of conditionality in the Court’s dicta hardly offered a
recipe for state action. Professor Mark Tushnet’s reading of the drafting history of the majority
decision is that to convince Justice Powell to join the majority, the decision invoked many
considerations without being clear as to which, if any, were controlling. Mark Tushnet, Justice
Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1862–73 (1995)
(book review).
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act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors
93
federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal.”
These points did not suffice to enable the Plyler defendants to
exclude noncitizen children from free public education, as the Court
found no evidence that “illegal entrants impose[d] any significant
burden on the State’s economy” or that “any illegal immigrants
c[a]me to this country . . . in order to avail themselves of a free
94
education.” Nevertheless, the Court’s discussion suggested that in
other contexts, some state authority to regulate immigrants might
exist. For example, Plyler indicated that states may respond to
“sudden shifts in population,” such as an “urgent demographic or
95
economic problem,” by denying benefits that might encourage
undocumented immigration, so long as the states’ responses are
96
consistent with federal law. The decision also suggested that states
may exercise emergency powers in emergency situations—and the
97
INA contains a provision to just that effect.
But Plyler recognized state authority to act only in relation to
traditional state interests and with respect to the state’s own activities
and concerns—for example, the provision of benefits and services. It
did not suggest that states may directly regulate the immigration or
removal of undocumented noncitizens. Although Plyler involved
individuals who were not authorized to be in the United States under
federal law, the Court explained that “the State has no direct interest
in controlling entry into this country, that interest being one reserved
98
by the Constitution to the Federal Government.”
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and
O’Connor, dissented because he concluded that Texas could deny
noncitizens access to public schools. Even so, the dissenting opinion
agreed that “[a] state has no power to prevent unlawful immigration,
and no power to deport illegal aliens; those powers are reserved

93. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 228.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1646 (2006) (limiting local, state, and federal benefits to
certain classes of noncitizens); State v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 629 (Alaska 1993) (concluding that
undocumented noncitizens are not entitled to a dividend from the Alaska Permanent Fund).
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (2006) (“[If a] mass influx of aliens . . . presents urgent
circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response, the Attorney General may authorize
any State or local law enforcement officer . . . to perform or exercise any of the
powers . . . conferred . . . by this chapter . . . upon officers or employees of the Service.”).
98. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 n.23.
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exclusively to Congress and the Executive.” De Canas and Plyler,
then, are properly understood as cases involving alienage, not
immigration, and as allowing some state regulation affecting
immigrants, but not the direct regulation of immigration itself.
Plyler and De Canas also make clear that regulation of
undocumented noncitizens can constitute “regulation of
immigration.” Arguably, the prohibition of the “regulation of
immigration” might refer only to the creation of substantive standards
for admission and exclusion, not to the application of federal
standards. The better interpretation, however, is that the De Canas
definition of a “regulation of immigration” as “a determination of
who should or should not be admitted into the country” includes both
the establishment of substantive standards and their administration—
100
the actual process of admitting, excluding, or removing noncitizens.
As the Supreme Court explained in Chy Lung, in the immigration
context, the national government has exclusive “responsibility for the
character of those regulations, and for the manner of their
101
execution.”
Therefore, even scrupulously applying federal standards, New
Mexico, for example, could not establish its own border-inspection
102
stations or exclude those it regarded as inadmissible. For the same
reason, North Dakota could not establish its own immigration
tribunals and order the deportation of undocumented people from
the interior of the United States, even if the tribunals carefully
103
applied federal standards. The federal government has exclusive

99. Id. at 242 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
100. See State v. Patel, 770 P.2d 390, 393 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (“Congress has occupied the
field of immigration law, excluding state control over deportation proceedings.”).
101. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1876).
102. See Tom Gerety, Children in the Labyrinth: The Complexities of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U.
PITT. L. REV. 379, 384–85 (1983) (arguing that a state-run immigration program would be
unconstitutional even if it mirrored federal regulations).
103. This point is made by the cases that hold that deportation cannot be imposed as part of
a criminal sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 960 (3d Cir. 1985)
(“[A]liens may be deported only in accordance with the carefully designed federal statutory and
regulatory scheme. . . . Congress has enacted laws governing the admission, expulsion, and
deportation of aliens. Those laws delegate authority to order deportation to the Attorney
General and not to the judiciary. Nowhere in this detailed statutory scheme is there a provision
for a court to deport aliens sua sponte.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Castillo-Burgos, 501 F.2d 217, 219–20 (9th Cir. 1974), abrogated by United States v.
Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc))); State v. Rattray, No. 85708, 2005 WL
2388271, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2005) (“[A]s the State concedes, the court had no
jurisdiction to impose lifetime deportation. An order of deportation is a matter within the sole
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authority not only to establish the standards for the admission and
104
exclusion of immigrants, but also to apply and enforce them.
In addition, deportation by any other name is still deportation.
State deterrence that aims to encourage undocumented noncitizens to
self-deport to another state or nation confuses a status—potentially
deportable alien—with a remedy—deportation. To be sure, states
may make themselves as unattractive to noncitizens as federal law
allows by, for example, cooperating with federal immigration
authorities, both civil and criminal, and denying noncitizens stateadministered benefits to the maximum extent permitted by the U.S.
Code and the Constitution. In addition, states likely have the power
to enact criminal laws that affect only undocumented noncitizens, so
long as those laws are rational, are within traditional state power,
seek a permissible goal, and are consistent with federal classifications.
Under this framework, state laws prohibiting the possession of
105
firearms by undocumented noncitizens are likely constitutional.
But states cannot impose criminal restrictions that are so broadly
applicable and onerous that they are tantamount to deportation. For
example, offering noncitizens a choice between prison and voluntary
106
deportation is equivalent to deportation. State laws deterring the
jurisdiction of the federal authorities.”); State v. Arviso, 993 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the lower court “trespassed into forbidden [Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS)] territory, violating the Supremacy Clause,” when it conditioned a suspended
sentence on the defendant’s not returning to the United States).
104. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950)
(“Congress may in broad terms authorize the executive to exercise the power, e.g., as was done
here, for the best interests of the country during a time of national emergency. Executive
officers may be entrusted with the duty of specifying the procedures for carrying out the
congressional intent.”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2006) (“[A] proceeding under this
section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be
admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United
States.”).
105. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A) (2006) (prohibiting undocumented noncitizens from
carrying firearms); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3101(A)(7)(e) (Supp. 2011) (defining an
undocumented alien as a prohibited possessor of a firearm); cf. Cubas v. Martinez, 819 N.Y.S.2d
10, 24 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that identity procedures that deny driver’s licenses to
undocumented aliens are constitutional).
106. This point is made in sentencing cases that hold that states have no power to impose
deportation even by agreement as a condition of probation. See, e.g., People v. AntonioAntimo, 29 P.3d 298, 302–03 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (finding that Colorado should not have
ordered the deportation of the defendant because such authority lies exclusively with the INS);
Torros v. State, 415 So. 2d 908, 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam) (“[D]eportation is a
federal matter. The trial court thus had no authority to order [the defendants’] deportation, and
the provision therefor must be stricken.” (citation omitted)); Sanchez v. State, 508 S.E.2d 185,
187 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (“Ordering a defendant to leave the country as a condition of probation
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entrance or compelling the departure of noncitizens by threat of
criminal prosecution constitute a “regulation of immigration” and are
therefore beyond state power. Restrictions so severe that they
107
practically compel departure are also equivalent to deportation.
Thus, a law making it a criminal offense for a noncitizen to use a
public street or sidewalk, to drink state-regulated water, or to breathe
state-regulated air would be tantamount to criminalizing the

constitutes an order of deportation.” (citing United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 959–61 (3d
Cir. 1985))); Rojas v. State, 450 A.2d 490, 492 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (holding an order not
to oppose deportation invalid and finding it “clear that the federal government has exclusive
authority over deportation proceedings”); State v. Pando, 921 P.2d 1285, 1286–88 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1996) (reversing the trial court’s decision, which required the defendant to leave and
remain outside the United States); Hernandez v. State, 613 S.W.2d 287, 289–90 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980) (“[T]he conditions of probation that ordered appellant to remain in the Republic of
Mexico and not to re-enter the United States without prior written consent of the court are
void.”). But see State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d 832, 833 (Idaho 1996) (holding that it is not improper
for a district court to order that a sentence be suspended if the INS acts to deport the
defendant).
107. In Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), the Court invalidated an Arizona law denying
legal aliens the right to work in many jobs. Id. at 35, 43. The Court held that this law violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and also interfered with the “authority to control immigration—to
admit or exclude aliens”—that “is vested solely in the Federal Government.” Id. at 42.
According to the Court,
The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood
when lawfully admitted . . . would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny
them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot
work. And . . . the practical result would be that those lawfully admitted to the
country under the authority of the acts of Congress . . . would be segregated in such of
the States as chose to offer hospitality.
Id. Of course, Truax involved lawfully admitted noncitizens, but that fact does not undermine
the conclusion that the “practical result” of state laws spurring self-deportation is departure
from the state or United States. The statute upheld in De Canas v. Bica did not clearly adopt a
different rule for undocumented noncitizens: it did not prohibit employment of undocumented
people entirely, and it applied only “if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful
resident workers.” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 352 (1976), superseded by statute,
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 101, § 274A(h)(2), 100
Stat. 3359, 3368, as recognized in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968
(2011).
If federal immigration authority is understood as a branch of the interstate- or foreigncommerce power, then a state policy, enforced through criminal law, to drive out undocumented
noncitizens would also seem to be a direct regulation. Of course, the threat of prosecution can
burden interstate commerce. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 376–77 (1946). Encouraging
noncitizens to self-deport to other states or foreign countries seems to be a direct regulation of
immigration because it is intended to have effects beyond any given state’s borders. Cf. Healy v.
Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989) (“[A] state law that has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating
commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce
Clause.”); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (“New York has no power to
project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk
acquired there.”).
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noncitizen’s mere presence in the state. Such laws are problematic
even if the targeted noncitizens fit the substantive standards for
removal under the INA.
This analysis suggests a problem with SB 1070 and other mirror109
110
image adoptions of the federal smuggling and harboring laws.
Two general readings of the statutes are available. First, they could
apply only to conduct that furthers an unlawful presence, in the sense
of either actively smuggling someone across the U.S. border to a
destination in the interior or actively evading immigration-law
111
enforcement. If so, then the statutes seem to constitute direct
regulations of the process of immigration itself. In many
circumstances, these statutes would make immigration to or through a
112
particular state a criminal offense under state law. That kind of
regulation is unproblematic when imposed by the national
113
government, but it is not within state authority.

108. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 220–21 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We recognize, of
course, that Hazleton’s housing provisions neither control actual physical entry into the City,
nor physically expel persons from it. Nonetheless, ‘[i]n essence,’ that is precisely what they
attempt to do. ‘It is difficult to conceive of a more effective method’ of ensuring that persons do
not enter or remain in a locality than by precluding their ability to live in it.” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 160, 164 (1989))), vacated mem., 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011); State v. Barros-Batistele, No. 05CR-1474, slip op. at 4 (N.H. Dist. Ct. Aug. 12, 2005) (“[T]he criminal trespass charges against
the defendants are unconstitutional attempts to regulate in the area of enforcement of
immigration violations, an area where Congress must be deemed to have regulated with such
civil sanctions and criminal penalties as it feels are sufficient.”).
109. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
111. Furthering the unlawful presence is a textual requirement of the smuggling statute. 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). The statutory language “shields from detection” requires
knowing evasion, and the word “conceals” strongly implies it. The “harboring” provision is
more ambiguous, but many courts have read in a requirement of intent to help evade detection
by law enforcement. E.g., United States v. Belevin-Ramales, 458 F. Supp. 2d 409, 411 (E.D. Ky.
2006).
112. The statute criminalizes transporting a noncitizen in a vehicle. That the liability is
placed on the transporter does not make it any less a regulation of immigration; many cases
invalidating state immigration laws were brought on behalf of transportation companies. See,
e.g., New York v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 59 (1883); Henderson v.
Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 260–61 (1876). It is also no less a regulation of immigration
simply because it does not cover all forms of immigration. That is, it would be a regulation of
immigration if Minnesota or New Mexico undertook to deport from the interior or exclude at
the border only those undocumented noncitizens traveling in vehicles and in groups of two or
more.
113. That is, states may pass legislation within their authority, such as statutes denying
undocumented noncitizens public benefits, as permitted by federal law, because they advance a
legitimate state end and do not themselves amount to a regulation of immigration, even if their
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An alternative, broader reading would be that many kinds of
114
ordinary daily activities violate the statute. For example, driving an
undocumented noncitizen to the doctor or grocery store could be
characterized as furthering that noncitizen’s unlawful presence. In a
sense, even allowing the noncitizen inside a store or hospital makes it
more difficult for law-enforcement officers to see the noncitizen, and
could, therefore, be construed as concealing, harboring, and shielding
the noncitizen from detection. Making everyday interactions with
undocumented people a crime, particularly interactions necessary to
sustain life, effectively forces noncitizens to choose between
deportation and severe physical deprivation. If this broad reading of
115
then they constitute a regulation of
the statutes is correct,
immigration because they require undocumented individuals either to
116
leave or to face great suffering and perhaps even criminal liability.
If a state criminal law that prohibits entrance or mandates
departure, either directly or only practically, constitutes a regulation
of immigration, then it is not within inherent state authority, and
some source of federal authority is necessary to sustain it. This much
may be consistent with the argument put forward by the supporters of

practical, indirect effect is to encourage self-deportation to some degree. But states may not
directly regulate immigration—say, by making it a crime, directly or indirectly, to be in the
state—even if they hope that the regulation will serve legitimate state ends like reducing crime
or saving state funds.
114. For an excellent discussion of the various “harboring” precedents, see generally Eisha
Jain, Immigration Enforcement and Harboring Doctrine, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147 (2010). Of
course, if states have the constitutional power to enact state laws dealing with immigration, then
their own courts can independently enforce and interpret them. See Ga. Latino Alliance for
Human Rights v. Deal, No. 1:11-CV-1804-TWT, 2011 WL 2520752, at *1, *13 (N.D. Ga. June
27, 2011) (preliminarily enjoining the Georgia immigration law passed in the wake of SB 1070,
in part because of a concern that “Georgia judges [would] interpret [the law’s] provisions,
unconstrained by . . . federal precedent”).
115. In the case of SB 1070 itself, a broad reading is supported by the text of the law, which
exempts Child Protective Services workers acting in the course of their duties, along with
certain ambulance attendants and emergency medical technicians “transporting or moving an
alien in this state pursuant to title 36, chapter 21.1,” a provision that deals with the licensing of
ambulance companies. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113,
sec. 5, § 13-2929(C), 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 457 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132929(E) (Supp. 2011)), as amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, § 6, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws
1070, 1078–79; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2201 to -2264 (2009 & Supp. 2011). This language
implies that the exception would not apply, say, to a neighbor—or, theoretically, a police
officer—who is not an EMT or ambulance attendant and who does not work for a licensed
ambulance company if that person transports an undocumented noncitizen to the hospital. That
such a person would be guilty of the offense illustrates the sheer breadth of the law’s scope.
116. Arizona accomplice-liability principles make a person who is being smuggled by
someone else liable for human smuggling. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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the cooperative-enforcement idea: they contend that state laws such
as SB 1070 are indeed authorized by federal case law and legislation.
Whether this argument is correct is addressed in the next Part.
II. THE DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATIVE
ENFORCEMENT
States, according to proponents of cooperative enforcement,
have clear authority under federal law to pass laws mirroring federal
immigration crimes. As then-Professor Kobach explains,
State governments possess the authority to criminalize particular
conduct concerning illegal immigration, provided that they do so in
a way that mirrors the terms of federal law. In this way, state
governments can utilize state and local law enforcement agencies to
enforce these state crimes, thereby reinforcing the efforts of federal
117
law enforcement agencies.

The mirror-image theory, then, suggests that state enactments
borrow authority from federal law: “As long as such state statutes
mirror federal statutory language and defer to the federal
government’s determination of the legal status of any alien in
118
question, they will be on secure constitutional footing.” Kobach
does not claim, however, that states have inherent sovereign authority
to regulate immigration; rather, in his view, “the states are only
permitted to act in ways that are in harmony with federal law and
119
consistent with congressional objectives.”
This authority comes from cases from the Ninth Circuit:
Such concurrent enforcement is clearly within a state’s authority. As
120
the Ninth Circuit [in Gonzales v. City of Peoria ] opined: “Where
state enforcement activities do not impair federal regulatory
interests concurrent enforcement activity is authorized.” Where
“[f]ederal and local enforcement have identical purposes,”
121
preemption does not occur.

117. Kobach, Reinforcing, supra note 16, at 475.
118. Id. at 476.
119. Id. at 483; see also supra note 27.
120. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other
grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999).
121. Kobach, Reinforcing, supra note 16, at 475 (second alteration in original) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474).
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Quoting the Second Circuit’s 1928 opinion in Marsh v. United
122
States, Kobach continues: “In the words of Judge Learned Hand, ‘it
would be unreasonable to suppose that [the federal government’s]
123
purpose was to deny itself any help that the states may allow.’”
Kobach thus takes a critical and faulty logical leap. Because
enforcement of federal law and policy by states is authorized, he
argues, so too is state legislation—so long as the state statutes are
mirror images of federal provisions.
For two reasons, this argument does not reach as far as Kobach
suggests. First, the case law Kobach cites does not support his claim.
Gonzales and Marsh allowed state assistance to federal authorities
124
through arrests, not through legislation or prosecution. The power to
assist through arrest does not imply the power to legislate or to
prosecute, because arrests leave crucial decisionmaking power in the
hands of the federal government, which is free to choose among the
criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions and remedies authorized
by the INA.
Second, the argument does not account for the structure of the
INA, which expressly invites certain forms of state assistance, but
only forms—like information sharing and arrests—that leave the
application of the INA to federal authorities. The state assistance
contemplated by the INA dovetails with other provisions that grant
federal agencies administrative and prosecutorial discretion in
particular cases, as well as supplementary lawmaking powers through
the promulgation of regulations.

122. Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1928).
123. Kobach, Reinforcing, supra note 16, at 475 (alteration in original) (quoting Marsh, 29
F.2d at 174).
124. Marsh upheld the “universal practice of police officers in New York to arrest for
federal crimes.” Marsh, 29 F.2d at 173. Gonzales upheld the authority of local police to arrest.
Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 477. Professor Michael Wishnie contends that even arrests by local
authorities are generally not authorized by the INA. Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police
Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1093 (2004). Similarly, Professor
Huyen Pham argues that local immigration enforcement through arrest is inherently
unconstitutional as nonuniform. Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority
Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 995–96 (2004). This Article assumes arguendo that Gonzales and
Marsh are good law to show that even if these cases are valid, the mirror-image doctrine is
unsound. If the powerful reasoning in the work of Professors Wishnie and Pham were to prevail
as a matter of doctrine, then there would be additional reasons for the invalidity of these forms
of state regulation.
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A. The Power To Arrest Versus the Power To Legislate
Based on Gonzales and Marsh, which allowed states to assist by
arresting for federal crimes, then-Professor Kobach contends that
125
states may also adopt federal crimes as part of state law. But the
power to arrest does not necessarily imply the power to legislate. As
the institution of citizen’s arrest makes clear, the authority to arrest
126
and the authority to criminalize are separate and distinct powers.
For example, local police are authorized by federal statute to
127
arrest deserters from active-duty service in the U.S. military. This
fact does not, however, imply that states and localities are invited to
establish rules for the military discipline of active-duty troops or to
128
try them in state courts. In the context of interpreting Article III,
the Supreme Court has held that the power to arrest is different from
129
the power to prosecute, try, and convict. In Robertson v. Baldwin,
the Court held that, notwithstanding the Article III requirement that
cases or controversies be decided in courts created by Congress, state
courts and officers could perform preliminary matters such as arrest.
The requirements of Article III apply “only to the trial and
determination of ‘cases’ in courts of record”; preliminary functions
“such, for instance, as the power . . . to arrest” and related duties
“incidental to the judicial power rather than a part of the judicial
130
power itself” can be delegated to state courts.
Marsh explicitly recognized the distinction between the power to
arrest and the power to try. Judge Hand explained that New York “is
concerned with the apprehension of offenders against laws of the

125. Kobach, Reinforcing, supra note 16, at 475.
126. That is, although private citizens are often allowed to make arrests for crimes, that fact
does not suggest that individual private citizens can create their own crimes and prosecute
people under them.
127. 10 U.S.C. § 808 (2006) (“Any civil officer having authority to apprehend offenders
under the laws of the United States or of a State . . . may summarily apprehend a deserter from
the armed forces and deliver him into the custody of those forces.”).
128. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (granting Congress the power “[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 1, 17 (1820) (“Over the national militia, the State governments never had, or could
have, jurisdiction. None such is conferred by the constitution of the United States; consequently,
none such can exist.”); United States v. Contreras, 69 M.J. 120, 121 n.4 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (noting
that courts-martial have exclusive jurisdiction over “purely military offenses” under Rule for
Courts-Martial 201(d)(1)).
129. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
130. Id. at 279.
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United States, valid within her borders, though they cannot be
131
prosecuted in her own courts.”
The difference between jurisdiction to arrest and jurisdiction to
legislate or try is illustrated by the rule that an arrest alone is
insufficient to trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because
an arrest alone does not constitute the commencement of adversary
132
proceedings. As a practical matter, prosecution is declined after
133
many arrests. That is, an arrest is not the same as a prosecution, and
134
many arrests never lead to prosecution. In addition, the function of
135
an arrest is to bring a defendant before a court. Accordingly,
although the Constitution requires that arrests be based on probable
cause, it does not require that arrests be carried out in any particular
place, or by any particular officer, jurisdiction, agency, or level of
government. Delegating arrest authority to the police of another

131. Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 1928).
132. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2592 (2008) (“[A] criminal defendant’s
initial appearance before a judicial officer . . . marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings
that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”).
133. See, e.g., Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations:
An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1444–45 (2004)
(describing prosecutorial trends from 1994 to 2000).
134. For practical purposes, a state or local arrest may lead to immigration consequences
even if federal criminal prosecution is declined. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That
Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1845 (2011) (“The high likelihood of a removal proceeding diminishes
any tempering of arrest patterns because of a decision not to prosecute criminally.”). But this
remains a choice for federal authorities and, as a legal matter, does not amount to a delegation
or transfer of decisionmaking authority any more than would a federal policy of investigating
complaints from private parties that particular individuals or workers were undocumented or
removable.
135. Even if an arrest is unlawful, a criminal case may proceed. E.g., United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (“The fact of respondent’s forcible abduction does
not therefore prohibit his trial in a court in the United States for violations of the criminal laws
of the United States.”); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19–21 (1990) (concluding that although
a home arrest without a warrant was illegal, the subsequent custody was legal and that,
therefore, otherwise-admissible statements could be used at trial).
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136

jurisdiction is now routine. The same cannot be said for legislation
137
or prosecution.
As an institutional matter, after arrest by the police, a different
official—the prosecutor—determines what charges, if any, are to be
filed. Ideally, well-trained police will present well-prepared cases to
prosecution agencies that are consistent with their prosecution
policies. But prosecutors make charging decisions in most
jurisdictions, including in federal courts. Therefore, an arrest does not
have the potential to interfere with federal authority in the same way
that a prosecution does. For all of these reasons, the authority to
arrest does not imply the authority to legislate or to try.
B. Power and Discretion in the INA
The mirror-image theory is, in part, an argument about what
Congress has done: that Congress has in fact invited state help in
enforcing immigration law. This proposition is true to some extent,
but, as this Section explains, the INA invites only specific forms of
state assistance with federal programs; it does not invite states to pass
their own laws or to enforce those laws at their discretion in their own
courts. In addition, the structure of the INA provides not only for
criminal penalties and deportation, but also for various forms of
temporary and permanent relief for people who could be subject to
deportation or prosecution. It assigns specific federal agencies to
carry out these provisions. This detailed and discretionary structure
leaves little room for the claim that Congress has, sub silentio, invited
states to come up with their own methods of driving out
undocumented noncitizens.
1. State Assistance to Federal Authorities in the INA. Proponents
of the mirror-image theory note that, in a variety of ways, the INA
seeks help from the states in enforcing civil and criminal immigration

136. That is, the police in any state may make arrests based on a warrant from any state
through the National Crime Information Center’s warrant system. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2,
cl. 2 (requiring states to deliver upon demand any individual charged with a crime in another
state); National Crime Information Center, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic (last
visited Oct. 7, 2011) (describing the National Crime Information Center—“an electronic
clearinghouse of crime data that can be tapped into by virtually every criminal justice agency
nationwide”). This practice, however, does not imply that legislatures in every state can pass
laws regulating conduct in any state.
137. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (noting that trials are to be “by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”).
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138

law. The most significant example is found in INA § 287(g), which
provides for the training of local law-enforcement officers and gives
them the power of federal immigration agents, pursuant to a written
139
agreement between the agency and the federal government. While
remaining in their regular jobs, under § 287(g), state and local officers
participate in the “investigation, apprehension, or detention” of aliens
140
who are removable under the INA.
Section 287(g) does not, however, contemplate that local lawenforcement agencies have the power to establish their own policies
or even to enforce federal law at their discretion. The INA provides
that “an officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a
State shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney
141
General.” Thus, § 287(g) officers work for the federal immigration
authorities, under their direction and control.
Several other provisions of federal law give local lawenforcement agencies authority independent of § 287(g), but there
too the authority is exclusively to assist the federal government, not
to make policy or independent decisions about enforcement. The
provision creating the § 287(g) program provides that an agreement is
not required for local law enforcement:
(A) to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the
immigration status of any individual, including reporting knowledge
that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the United States; or
(B) otherwise to cooperate with the Attorney General in the
identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not
142
lawfully present in the United States.

138. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 31,
at 3–7 (discussing congressional enactments intended to “encourage cooperation between
federal, state, and local law enforcement officers regarding violations of federal immigration
laws”); Brief of Amici Curiae, Members of the United States Congress Trent Franks et al., supra
note 19, at 5 (“Congress has passed numerous acts that welcome state involvement in
immigration control.”).
139. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006). Notwithstanding this law’s U.S. Code citation, it is often
referred to by its INA section number: 287(g).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 1357(g)(3); see also id. § 1357(g)(5) (providing that § 287(g) agreements must
identify a federal supervisor).
142. Id. § 1357(g)(10).

CHIN IN PRINTER PROOF

284

10/13/2011 9:46:53 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:251

Thus, the INA authorizes the free sharing of information in
143
§ 287(g)(10)(A), and it allows local police to “cooperate with the
Attorney General” in § 287(g)(10)(B). Another section allows for the
arrests of noncitizens who are in the United States unlawfully and
144
who reentered after having been convicted of a felony. The INA
grants local police access to federal immigration stations for the
145
purpose of enforcing state law. But the INA contains no invitation
to draft laws, complementary or otherwise, nor does it even imply
that mere arrests can be made other than in cooperation with the
146
attorney general.

143. It does so in two other provisions as well. Section 1644 of title 8 of the U.S. Code
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local
government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or
receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2006). Section 1373 of title 8 is similar. See id. § 1373(a) (using language nearly
identical to that found in § 1644 to provide that no federal, state, or local government entity
shall restrict any other government entity or official from exchanging information regarding the
immigration status of an alien with the Immigration and Naturalization Service); id. § 1373(b)
(using nearly identical language to provide that no person or agency shall prohibit a federal,
state, or local government agency from exchanging information regarding an individual’s
immigration status with the Immigration and Naturalization Service; from maintaining such
information; or from exchanging such information with any other federal, state, or local
government entity).
144. See id. § 1252c (authorizing state and local law-enforcement officials to “arrest and
detain” “any individual” who “is an alien illegally present in the United States” and who “has
previously been convicted of a felony in the United States and deported or left in the United
States after such conviction”).
145. See id. § 1358 (requiring the officers in charge of various immigration stations to admit
local law-enforcement officials to those stations and providing that the jurisdiction of local lawenforcement officials shall extend to those stations). Another provision authorizes federal
payments to states for housing immigration detainees. See id. § 1103(a)(11)(A) (authorizing
payments for “necessary clothing, medical care, necessary guard hire, and the housing, care, and
security of persons detained by the Service pursuant to Federal law under an agreement with a
State or political subdivision of a State”).
146. The idea of state cooperation with federal authorities is also reflected in Marsh and
Gonzales. In Gonzales, the court noted that there was “a letter from the United States Attorney
for the District of Arizona . . . advis[ing] . . . that officers who, in the course of their normal
duties, encountered undocumented aliens suspected of illegal entry, could temporarily detain
them while contacting the Border Patrol.” Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 473–74 (9th
Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.
1999). At the time of Marsh, federal authorities were known to specifically request help from
the law-enforcement agency involved, Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 315 n.2 (1927)
(“[T]he Federal Prohibition Director in New York City announced that he would call upon the
Superintendent of State Troopers . . . to aid in arresting violators of the National Prohibition
Act.”), particularly when dealing with crimes like the one in that case—a Prohibition offense,
over which “[t]he Eighteenth Amendment gave concurrent jurisdiction to the states.” Marsh v.
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2. Federal Authority in the INA. Federal law contemplates that
states will be involved in enforcing federal immigration law, but only
by providing information and working cooperatively under the
supervision of federal enforcement authorities. In contrast to the
limited state role, the INA explicitly gives federal authorities broad
administrative and prosecutorial discretion, along with the power to
supplement the statute itself through regulations. The primary point
here is not that the INA takes away from the states any authority they
might have had in the absence of federal legislation, but that the INA
is not a source of state policy discretion or legislative authority,
except in the very limited ways it expressly provides.
The INA, at the time it was originally enacted in 1952, was a
“comprehensive recodification of all federal immigration and
147
naturalization laws,” civil and criminal. It regulates the procedural
and substantive aspects of admission, exclusion, and removal of
148
noncitizens, as well as their naturalization. It also includes civil and
criminal penalties for particular conduct.
Consistent with the background principle of constitutional law
that immigration is primarily a federal responsibility, Congress has
assigned its enforcement to federal authorities:
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the
administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws
relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens, except
insofar as this chapter or such laws relate to the powers, functions,
and duties conferred upon the President, Attorney General, the
Secretary of State, the officers of the Department of State, or
149
diplomatic or consular officers . . . .

United States, 29 F.2d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 1928). In sum, the laws enacted by Congress do not
imply authorization for independent state statutory regulation of immigration or any action
other than in cooperation with the United States.
147. United States v. Sanchez-Vargas, 878 F.2d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 1989).
148. See Galvez-Maldonado ex rel. Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting
that Congress, in passing the INA, intended “to enact a comprehensive, revised immigration,
naturalization, and nationality code” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 1 (1952), reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1653) (internal quotation marks omitted)), vacated and superseded on
reh’g, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292
(1993).
149. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). Before the September 11 attacks, Congress charged the
Department of Justice with the immigration-related functions now assigned to the Department
of Homeland Security. See generally Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
§§ 441–78, 116 Stat. 2135, 2192–2212 (detailing the reassignment of such functions).
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Specified federal agencies, but no others, can enact regulations.
And, as Justice Scalia explained in a 2009 concurrence, “It is to
agency officials . . . that Congress has given discretion to choose
151
among permissible interpretations of the statute.”
For many kinds of conduct—including conduct that might trigger
federal criminal immigration statutes—federal law authorizes several
possible responses and the specific actors who can effect those
responses. At the broadest level, federal law assigns responsibility for
deciding which judicial penalties to seek. Congress has reserved “the
conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer
thereof is a party, or is interested . . . to officers of the Department of
152
Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.” This general
power to choose between acting and not acting, and among pursuing
criminal charges; civil sanctions; administrative remedies, such as
voluntary deportation or removal; or some combination thereof, is
also an inherent and explicit part of the structure of the INA.
Take, for example, an undocumented person who has entered
the United States by surreptitiously crossing the border into Arizona.
That person will have committed the most common immigration
crime: entering the United States “at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers” in violation of 8 U.S.C.
153
§ 1325(a)(1). But § 1325 specifically provides for an alternative civil
penalty of between $50 and $250, “in addition to, and not in lieu of,
154
any criminal or other civil penalties that may be imposed.” That is,
although neither is required, the statute itself recognizes that there
could be a mix of civil penalties and criminal penalties imposed at the
discretion of federal immigration officers.
The problem of discretion is even more profound in an
administrative regime like the INA. Under the INA, the Department
of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice have a range of
options when dealing with a particular undocumented person,
including criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). The

150. See, e.g., id. § 1103(a)(3) (authorizing the secretary of homeland security to “establish
such regulations . . . as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of
this chapter”); id. § 1103(g)(2) (authorizing the attorney general to “establish such
regulations . . . as [he] determines to be necessary for carrying out this section”).
151. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1170 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
152. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006).
153. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
154. Id. § 1325(b).
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individual could also be formally removed from the United States
156
or could be allowed to depart voluntarily. Each of these options has
substantially different legal consequences.
The INA authorizes benefits as well as sanctions. For example,
federal law creates opportunities for an undocumented person to
remain in the United States temporarily or permanently. Through the
“deferred action” program, a noncitizen, based on compelling
circumstances, may be allowed to stay and work in the United
157
States. Noncitizens may have the right to remain in the United
158
States because of a threat in their home country. A noncitizen may
also be entitled to some other form of temporary or permanent relief,
159
such as “registry” or a T visa, both of which are available, at the
discretion of the secretary of homeland security, to individuals who
160
have been trafficked and to certain relatives of those individuals.
The agencies have elaborate administrative regimes to evaluate
and consider claims. These include immigration judges and the Board
of Immigration Appeals, both of which are part of the Justice
Department. No serious argument exists that states can administer
most of this regime; they cannot, for example, grant registry or a
voluntary departure under the INA even if a particular noncitizen
161
would otherwise be eligible under the statute. The fact that states

155. See id. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (“An alien present in the United States without being
admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.”).
156. See id. § 1229c(a)(1) (“The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart
the United States at the alien’s own expense under this subsection, in lieu of being subject to
proceedings under section 1229a of this title or prior to the completion of such
proceedings . . . .”).
157. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2011) (authorizing deferred action, “an act of
administrative convenience to the government which gives some cases lower priority, if the alien
establishes an economic necessity for employment”).
158. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (outlining the requirements and procedures for gaining asylum); id.
§ 1231(b)(3) (providing, subject to certain exceptions, that the attorney general may not remove
an alien to a given country if the attorney general determines that the alien’s life or freedom
would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, or
identification with a certain social group or political opinion).
159. See id. § 1259 (authorizing the attorney general to make a “record of lawful admission
for permanent residence” for an alien who entered the United States before January 1, 1972,
has resided in the United States continuously since entry, has good moral character, is not
ineligible for citizenship, and has not participated in terrorist activities).
160. See id. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (excepting from the statutory definition of “immigrant” an
alien who is determined to have been the victim of trafficking).
161. Indeed, the idea that local authorities could grant asylum is so outlandish that it was
made the punchline of a joke in a television show. See “Barney Miller” Asylum (TV episode
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are unquestionably disabled from applying most of the provisions of
the INA is solid evidence that they have no power to administer any
162
of it, except as it expressly provides.
Courts are hesitant to interfere with federal administrative
decisions even when they disagree with an agency’s action; indeed,
the Court has acknowledged that “[t]he fact that [it] might not have
made the same determination on the same facts does not warrant a
substitution of judicial for administrative discretion since Congress
163
has confided the problem to the latter.” It would thus be odd to
allow states more power than courts to overrule decisions made by
the agencies assigned by Congress to make them. To the contrary, on
several occasions, the Court has halted state efforts to assume the
164
power to prosecute under federal statutes. Prosecution by states in
cases in which federal immigration authorities would not have
prosecuted “presents a serious danger of conflict with the
administration of the federal program” and runs the risk of
“hampering . . . uniform enforcement of [the federal government’s]
165
program by sporadic local prosecutions.”
In addition, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the risk that
local prosecution will be based on impermissible or inappropriate
166
considerations. In its 1890 decision in In re Loney, for example, the
Court observed that state prosecution of alleged wrongs occurring in
federal tribunals could lead to “prosecution and punishment in the
courts of the State upon a charge of perjury, preferred by a

1977), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0518996 (last visited Oct. 7, 2011) (discussing a 1977
episode of the TV show Barney Miller entitled Asylum, in which Wojo, a New York police
detective, “prematurely grants asylum to a Russian defector”).
162. Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982) (“[T]here is no assurance that a child subject
to deportation will ever be deported. An illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to
continue to reside in this country, or even to become a citizen.”).
163. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394 (1981) (quoting FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223,
229 (1946)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (“[T]his Court has for more than
four decades emphasized that the formulation of procedures was basically to be left within the
discretion of the agencies to which Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive
judgments.”).
164. See supra Part II.A.
165. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956). Of course, the United States could
sue a state each time a state prosecution or other immigration action interfered with federal
choices. See, e.g., Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100–01 (1928) (upholding an injunction
against the enforcement of Arizona game laws in a national park when those laws interfered
with the regulatory authority of park officials).
166. In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890).
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disappointed suitor or contestant, or instigated by local passion or
167
prejudice.”
168
In the 1956 decision in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, one reason the
Supreme Court found that a state sedition act was preempted by
federal sedition law was that
indictment . . . can be initiated upon an information made by a
private individual. The opportunity thus present for the indulgence
of personal spite and hatred or for furthering some selfish advantage
or ambition need only be mentioned to be appreciated. . . . It is
important that punitive sanctions for sedition against the United
States be such as have been promulgated by the central
governmental authority and administered under the supervision and
169
review of that authority’s judiciary.

Further militating against the assumption of implied state
criminal authority in immigration cases is the near certainty that such
efforts will be motivated by disagreement with federal enforcement
170
policy. If state efforts were actually aimed at supporting federal
authority, then separate state charges, trials, or punishments would
make little sense. Because state officers can arrest suspected violators
for federal immigration crimes, they already have the power to
deliver offenders to the federal government. And from a fiscal
perspective, the state has an excellent financial reason to do so:
prosecution and incarceration would be paid for by the federal
government. Arizona and other states have previously sued the
United States for reimbursement of the cost of housing

167. Id. at 375.
168. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
169. Id. at 507–08 (quoting Commonwealth v. Nelson, 104 A.2d 133, 141 (Pa. 1954)); cf. Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (“The creation of a private right of action raises
issues beyond the mere consideration whether underlying primary conduct should be allowed or
not, entailing, for example, a decision to permit enforcement without the check imposed by
prosecutorial discretion. Accordingly, even when Congress has made it clear by statute that a
rule applies to purely domestic conduct, we are reluctant to infer intent to provide a private
cause of action where the statute does not supply one expressly.”).
170. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987), Justice Scalia
voted to reverse a contempt conviction because private attorneys had been appointed to
prosecute the contempt instead of the U.S. Attorney’s Office: “The very argument given for
permitting a court to appoint an attorney to prosecute contempts—that the United States
Attorney might exercise his prosecutorial discretion not to pursue the contemners—makes clear
that that is the result required.” Id. at 825 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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undocumented prisoners, demonstrating that states are not eager to
171
incur these expenses.
It seems likely that a state would assume the costs of prosecution
and punishment itself not because it sincerely wanted to help the
federal government, but rather because the United States was not
targeting the noncitizens whom the state expected to prosecute under
172
its new immigration laws. No one can plausibly claim that the
INA—a statute granting federal administrative agencies the authority
and discretion to choose the disposition of particular cases—was
actually intended, sub silentio, to grant states the authority to
overrule agency decisions.
In sum, the INA approves a range of responses to undocumented
immigrants discovered in the United States, and it directs the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice to
carry them out at their discretion. Although a state wishing to enforce
immigration law in its own way may share some of the goals of
national immigration policy, the criminal, civil, or administrative
structure created by Congress contains no hint that states are
authorized to develop independent state policy; after all, “[t]he fact of
173
a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means.”
Finally, if what states have already done is any evidence, state
immigration policies will vary widely. Although proponents of the
mirror-image theory claim that state enactments mirror federal law,
the state statutes are not, in fact, the same as the federal versions. For
174
example, of the eight state statutes similar to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a),

171. See California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
California’s claim that the attorney general had violated 8 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994) by refusing to
reimburse the state for the costs of incarcerating illegal aliens and noting that the attorney
general’s decision was committed to agency discretion by law and was thus not subject to
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006)); Arizona
v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopting reasoning from California v.
United States to affirm the district court’s judgment).
172. Immigration and Customs Enforcement establishes formal enforcement priorities. In
2011, for example, the agency determined that first priority for deportation went to “[a]liens
who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public safety,” second priority went to
“[r]ecent illegal entrants,” and third went to “[a]liens who are fugitives or otherwise obstruct
immigration controls.” Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All Employees of U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement 1–3 (Mar. 2,
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf.
173. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379 (2000).
174. See supra notes 1–14.
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none is identical to the federal provision—nor, for that matter, to any
175
of its siblings.
C. The Special Problem of State Criminal Immigration Policy
The decision in Arizona to enforce state immigration law
through criminal sanctions is so out of keeping with longstanding
authority that its criminal oddness has been overlooked. But it is
nevertheless important to step back and recognize that there is no
history or tradition of states’ enforcing federal criminal claims in state
court.
In the civil context, the Supreme Court has “consistently held
that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively
competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United
176
States.” Indeed, the Court has held that the Supremacy Clause
sometimes requires state courts to hear federal civil causes of
177
action. This policy is ancient: in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the first
Congress provided that “the circuit courts shall have original
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all
suits of a civil nature at common law” involving the United States as a
178
plaintiff, as well as several of the other familiar categories.
The presumption is reversed, however, with respect to federal
crimes. Again, the authority is foundational: the Judiciary Act of 1789
established the general rule that federal courts “shall have,
exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes
and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the

175. When the Supreme Court, based on the need for a uniform national policy, invalidated
a state law prohibiting sedition against the United States, it noted that “[s]hould the States be
permitted to exercise a concurrent jurisdiction in this area, federal enforcement would
encounter . . . the added conflict engendered by different criteria of substantive offenses.”
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 509 (1956).
176. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). See generally Margaret H. Lemos, State
Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2011) (surveying the different features of
state enforcement of federal law and attempting to explicate the respects in which enforcing
federal laws might allow states to wield power that is at once narrower and broader than
traditional regulatory mechanisms).
177. See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2117–18 (2009) (holding that a state
statute divesting state courts of authority to hear claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) was
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1947)
(holding that state courts, granted jurisdiction by Congress over the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (expired 1947), including the treble-damages
provision, could not decline to entertain a claim brought under the Act).
178. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79.
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United States.” The policy was later enshrined in 18 U.S.C. § 3231,
which provides, “The district courts of the United States shall have
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all
offenses against the laws of the United States.” Accordingly, in the
criminal context, Congress generally neither wants nor allows the
help of the states in prosecuting federal crimes.
Although § 3231 recognizes the possibility of concurrent
jurisdiction—providing that “[n]othing in this title shall be held to
take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States
under the laws thereof”—it is not a grant of power for states to enact
180
criminal laws related to federal criminal statutes. As the Supreme
Court noted in 1903, this section “was intended to leave with the state
court, unimpaired, the same jurisdiction over the act that it would
181
have had if Congress had not passed an act on the subject.” That an
identical or similar federal crime is on the books does not necessarily
prevent “the State from prosecuting where the same act constitutes
182
both a federal offense and a state offense under the police power.”
183
For example, in Fox v. Ohio, the Court held that states have the
authority to prohibit passing counterfeit currency, even though the
national government had exclusive jurisdiction over counterfeiting
itself. According to the Court, state legislative action in that area is
justified because fraudulent transactions can have damaging local
184
effects. Thus, the Court later indicated that the question of whether
a state has the power to criminalize turns on whether the subject
185
matter is “within the scope [of the state’s] police powers.”

179. Id. § 9.
180. Nelson, 350 U.S. at 501 n.10 (invalidating a state sedition law and stating that “[t]here
was no intention to resolve particular supersession questions by the Section”).
181. Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1903).
182. Nelson, 350 U.S. at 500.
183. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
184. Id. at 434 (“The punishment of a cheat or a misdemeanour practised within the State,
and against those whom she is bound to protect, is peculiarly and appropriately within her
functions and duties . . . .”). Similarly, a state may address a breach of the peace even if it occurs
in connection with a federally regulated activity. See, e.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S.
131, 139 (1957) (upholding a state injunction insofar as it prohibited acts of violence by union
members on strike, even though such activities fall within the domain of the National Labor
Relations Board).
185. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963). In this case, the
Court concluded that the regulation of food for sale is “traditionally regarded as properly within
the scope of state superintendence.” Id. at 144.

CHIN IN PRINTER PROOF

2011]

10/13/2011 9:46:53 AM

STATE REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION

293

A substantial range of exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction may
186
seem startling given the historical state primacy in criminal law and
the tradition of concurrent criminal enforcement. Indeed, the
increasing overlap of federal and state law—often characterized as
the “federalization of criminal law”—has been driven primarily by
187
the creation of new federal crimes and policies. The existence of
dual and independent federal and state criminal power over identical
acts has been highlighted for more than fifty years by doublejeopardy cases that have recognized the states and the United States
188
as “dual sovereigns.”
In recent decades, decisions recognizing exclusive state criminal
jurisdiction have been more prominent in the Court than decisions
189
recognizing exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction. For example, in
190
United States v. Morrison, the Court struck down part of the
191
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which had extended federal
jurisdiction to civil actions for violent assaults against women,

186. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 96 (1964) (White, J., concurring)
(“[T]he States still bear primary responsibility . . . for the administration of the criminal law;
most crimes . . . are matters of local concern; federal preemption of areas of crime control
traditionally reserved to the States has been relatively unknown and this area [may] be at the
core of the continuing viability of the States in our federal system.”); Barbier v. Connolly, 113
U.S. 27, 31 (1885) (discussing “the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the
people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources, and
add to its wealth and prosperity”).
187. E.g., TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, ABA, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 5–16 (1998) (discussing the growth of the federal
criminal-justice system and the effects of that growth); Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime:
Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40
(1996).
188. E.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194 (1959) (“We have here two
sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subjectmatter within the same territory. . . . Each government in determining what shall be an offense
against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.” (omission
in original) (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)) (internal quotation mark
omitted)).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (invalidating part of the GunFree School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844–45 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2006)); see also United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th
Cir. 2005) (upholding a revised version of the statute that requires the firearm to have traveled
in interstate commerce).
190. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
191. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796,
1902–55 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.), invalidated in part
by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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192

But the Court in
because of an insufficient federal interest.
Morrison contemplated the possibility of exclusive federal authority
no less than that of exclusive state jurisdiction, holding that “[t]he
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and
193
what is truly local.”
The Supreme Court has long recognized that both dual and
concurrent sovereignty require states to have some basis for their
authority and that neither theory applies in areas of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. According to the Court, these theories “will be found to
relate only to cases where the act sought to be punished is one over
which both sovereignties have jurisdiction. . . . [They have] no
application where one of the governments has exclusive jurisdiction
194
of the subject-matter and therefore the exclusive power to punish.”
Because there are a number of truly national interests, there are a
number of areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction created by the
195
196
197
by statute,
and by case law.
These include
Constitution,
198
199
jurisdiction over Indian reservations, military facilities, national

192. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (“[W]e can think of no better example of the police power,
which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”).
193. Id. at 617–18; see also United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1982 (2010) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he duty to protect citizens from violent crime, including acts of sexual
violence, belongs solely to the States.”).
194. S. Ry. v. R.R. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 439, 445–46 (1915).
195. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (granting Congress the power to enact “exclusive
Legislation” for the erection of forts, dockyards, and other “needful Buildings”); see also Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 617–18 (1842) (“[F]or if Congress have a constitutional
power to regulate a particular subject, and they do actually regulate it in a given manner, and in
a certain form, it cannot be that the state legislatures have a right to interfere . . . .”).
196. E.g., Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 54 F.3d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1995)
(enjoining state enforcement of state laws on tribal land because of a statute that provided that
“[t]he United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of violations of
State gambling laws” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (1994))).
197. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 509 (1956) (invalidating a state sedition
law); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73–74 (1941) (invalidating a state alien-registration law).
198. E.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984) (affirming a grant of habeas corpus to a
tribal member prosecuted by South Dakota for conduct within exclusive federal and tribal
jurisdiction).
199. E.g., State v. Smith, 400 S.E.2d 405, 407 (N.C. 1991) (dismissing the defendant’s charges
and explaining that the state court lacked jurisdiction over a murder committed by a civilian at
Camp Lejeune, because “[i]n criminal cases dealing with this problem the federal courts have
said the jurisdiction of the United States is exclusive” (citing United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S.
138 (1930))).

CHIN IN PRINTER PROOF

2011]

10/13/2011 9:46:53 AM

STATE REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION
200

295

201

banks, and national parks. Exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction,
then, is not particularly anomalous.
III. COULD CONGRESS AUTHORIZE STATE ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW?
This is not the first time in American legal history that state
attempts to regulate immigration have been judicially rebuffed. On
several occasions, however, the political forces demanding state
regulation have subsequently moved Congress to respond by passing
federal immigration statutes. For example, after courts invalidated
state efforts to regulate Chinese immigration in the 1870s, Congress
202
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. And after a federal court
enjoined California’s efforts to regulate undocumented immigration
in the 1990s, Congress expressly authorized local police to cooperate
203
with federal enforcement efforts.
200. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 14 (2007) (“‘Th[e] legislation has in view
the erection of a system extending throughout the country, and independent, so far as powers
conferred are concerned, of state legislation which, if permitted to be applicable, might impose
limitations and restrictions as various and as numerous as the States.’ Congress did not intend,
we explained, ‘to leave the field open for the States to attempt to promote the welfare and
stability of national banks by direct legislation. . . . [C]onfusion would necessarily result from
control possessed and exercised by two independent authorities.’” (alterations and omission in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 229, 231–32 (1903)). Easton
v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220 (1903), held that a generally applicable state banking statute prohibiting
the taking of deposits while insolvent could not be applied to a national bank. Id. at 239.
201. E.g., Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 30 (1939) (holding that because Chickamauga
and Chattanooga National Park in the State of Georgia is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, “violations of law occurring on the ceded lands are enforceable only by the
proper authorities of the United States”).
202. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
203. In 1995, a U.S. district court enjoined many provisions of California’s Proposition 187,
which involved state police officers in federal immigration enforcement. League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 764 (C.D. Cal. 1995). In 1996, Congress passed the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 42 U.S.C.), a
statute that contained many provisions dealing with noncitizens, including § 434, which allowed
communication between state and local officials and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563, added INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g) (2006), which allowed for the deputizing of local officers and other cooperation
between state authorities and federal immigration officials. IIRIRA also made federal
immigration law more enforcement-oriented. See Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity:
Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 637–39 (2003)
(describing “the enactment of . . . the IIRIRA in . . . September of 1996” and its “emphasis . . .
on enhancing immigration law enforcement”). Many scholars note the relationship between the
failure of Proposition 187 and the enactment of federal legislation allowing state action. See,
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Accordingly, it is at least possible that Congress will respond to
state concerns about immigration by explicitly authorizing states to
adopt complementary immigration statutes. In other words, Congress
might actually do what supporters of state immigration enforcement
erroneously claim Congress has already done. This Part proposes that
Congress could not constitutionally pass such legislation because
Congress cannot delegate its exclusive legislative authority, nor can it
authorize states to carry out federal executive powers.
A. State Legislative Power To Enact Criminal Immigration Laws
One aspect of the problem is the states’ authority to enact
immigration laws. The relevant question is whether states could, with
the permission of Congress, enact criminal legislation that would be
litigated in their own courts if the field would otherwise fall within
exclusive federal jurisdiction. In the celebrated 1816 decision Martin
204
v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Supreme Court observed that “[n]o part of
the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can, consistently with
205
the constitution, be delegated to state tribunals.” The literal truth of
206
this dictum is debated. Surely Congress can draw lines, even in
favor of the states, delimiting the authority of the state and national
governments in areas of shared responsibility. But Martin correctly
indicated that Congress may not delegate legislative authority over
matters that the Constitution identifies as exclusively federal.
First, a contrary rule would make it possible for Congress to
repudiate the Constitution by mere statute without going through the
amendment process prescribed in Article V. If, for example, Congress
could validly authorize states to decide, at their discretion, who is to
be admitted or excluded, who may be naturalized, and what the
relevant procedure is—or, for that matter, if Congress could provide
e.g., Raquel E. Aldana, Introduction: The Subordination and Anti-Subordination Story of the
U.S. Immigrant Experience in the 21st Century, 7 NEV. L.J. 713, 719 (2007) (“[T]he failure of
Proposition 187 became the impetus for Congress’ passage of the PRWORA.”); Juliet P.
Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1557, 1590–91 (2008) (“After the courts enjoined California’s Proposition 187, the state
turned to Congress to push for similar federal legislation.”). See generally Douglas NeJaime,
Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011) (discussing the mobilizing effects of
litigation failure).
204. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
205. Id. at 337.
206. See generally Michael G. Collins, The Federal Courts, the First Congress, and the NonSettlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1519–20 (2005) (describing the debate regarding the
allocation of Article III business to non-Article III tribunals).
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that the states could make treaties or declare war—then the
constitutional structure would be dramatically changed. Indeed, in De
Canas, the Court referred to “a constitutionally proscribed regulation
of immigration that Congress itself would be powerless to authorize
207
or approve.” The Court seemed to conclude, albeit in dicta, that if a
state action were a regulation of immigration, it would be
unconstitutional even with the permission of Congress.
A number of holdings suggest that Congress cannot delegate its
exclusive powers. In the 1920 decision in Knickerbocker Ice v.
208
the Court held that Congress could not make state
Stewart,
workers’ compensation laws applicable within the exclusive admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of Congress. The Court reasoned that
Congress’s power
to legislate concerning rights and liabilities within the maritime
jurisdiction . . . arises from the Constitution . . . . The definite object
of the grant was to commit direct control to the Federal
Government; to relieve maritime commerce from unnecessary
burdens and disadvantages incident to discordant legislation; and to
establish, so far as practicable, harmonious and uniform rules
applicable throughout every part of the Union.
. . . The subject was intrusted to it to be dealt with according to its
discretion—not for delegation to others. To say that because
Congress could have enacted a compensation act applicable to
maritime injuries, it could authorize the States to do so as they might
desire, is false reasoning. Moreover, such an authorization would
inevitably destroy the harmony and uniformity which the
Constitution not only contemplated but actually established—it
would defeat the very purpose of the grant.
Congress cannot transfer its legislative authority to the States—
209
by nature this is non-delegable.

207. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976), superseded by statute, Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 101, § 274A(h)(2), 100 Stat. 3359, 3368, as
recognized in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
208. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
209. Id. at 164 (citation omitted). Justice Holmes dissented for himself and three others, but
the coalition agreed with the majority on the general point: “I assume that Congress could not
delegate to state legislatures the simple power to decide what the law of the United States
should be in that district.” Id. at 169 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Although Knickerbocker Ice is nearly a century old and the
nondelegation doctrine is in some disrepute, when applied to
exclusive powers, the decision still stands for a vital principle. For
210
example, in Clinton v. City of New York, the line-item-veto case,
the six-Justice majority explained that Congress could not delegate
“lawmaking authority, or its functional equivalent, to the
211
President”; “[t]he fact that Congress intended such a result is of no
212
moment.”
Justice Scalia’s dissent on this issue, joined by Justices Breyer
and O’Connor, emphasized that the problem was technical; instead of
authorizing the president to “veto” a line item in a budget bill,
Congress could instead have simply made spending the funds
discretionary on the part of the president, an almost certainly
213
But it is
constitutional method of achieving the same result.
doubtful that even the dissenters would have allowed the delegation
of an exclusive federal power to the states. In his dissent, Justice
Scalia noted that when congressional authorization “is allowed to go
too far, it usurps the nondelegable function of Congress and violates
214
the separation of powers.” Justice Breyer acknowledged that the
statute “skirts a constitutional edge,” but he concluded that it
remained within that edge because
[t]he means chosen do not amount literally to the enactment, repeal,
or amendment of a law. . . . Those means do not violate any basic
separation-of-powers principle. They do not improperly shift the
constitutionally foreseen balance of power from Congress to the

210. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
211. Id. at 448.
212. Id. at 445–46; see also id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“That a congressional
cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocuous. The Constitution is a compact
enduring for more than our time, and one Congress cannot yield up its own powers, much less
those of other Congresses to follow. Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional
design.” (citations omitted)).
213. Id. at 468–69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The short of the
matter is this: Had the . . . Act authorized the President to ‘decline to spend’ any item of
spending contained in [a congressional budget], there is not the slightest doubt that
authorization would have been constitutional.”); see also id. at 488 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“Congress has frequently delegated the President the authority to spend, or not to spend,
particular sums of money.”).
214. Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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President. Nor, since they comply with separation-of-powers
215
principles, do they threaten the liberties of individual citizens.

Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that some powers of
Congress are nondelegable.
B. Presidential Authority over Federal Criminal Prosecutions
Regardless of any connection to the immigration context, a
congressional decision to allow state officers to execute federal law
would create a serious constitutional question. The problem is
exacerbated in the immigration context, in which—because of the
connection between immigration enforcement, national security, and
foreign policy—presidential authority is particularly important.
1. Executive Authority To Execute the Laws. It would very likely
be unconstitutional for state prosecutors to prosecute violations of
216
federal criminal law. A federal criminal prosecution is “an exercise
217
of the sovereign power of the United States.” This is particularly so
because prosecutorial authority is not mechanical or rote; it includes
the affirmative power to charge, discretion as to what offenses to
charge, and the negative power to not charge even if probable cause
exists. In a case rejecting the prosecution of a federal defendant for

215. Id. at 496 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In this context, it is worth noting the many ways in
which the Constitution deems treatment of noncitizens to be an exclusively federal matter or at
least one in which the federal government should be an available decisionmaker. These include
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, giving Congress the power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization”; Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
“[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls”; Article III, Section
2, Clause 1, creating federal jurisdiction in cases “between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects”; and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due
process and equal protection to “persons” (not, say, citizens), which was done to ensure that
noncitizens were included within its protection, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 195–202
(1976) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing the Reconstruction-era history of civil rights laws);
John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and the
Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3
ASIAN L.J. 55, 55 (1996) (describing how the historic perception of Asian Americans as
“intrinsically foreign and unassimilable” influenced the post-Reconstruction civil rights laws).
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, is another indicator of the
Constitution’s fear of local prejudice on the part of the states. Also, the list of foreign-policy
actions forbidden to the states or forbidden without the permission of Congress, id. art. I, § 10,
illustrates the limitations on state authority in this area.
216. See Michael G. Collins & Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting Federal Crimes in State
Courts, 97 VA. L. REV. 243, 247–51 (2011) (arguing that it would be unconstitutional to allow
state prosecutors to prosecute federal crimes).
217. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 700 (1988).
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the felony of “using a communication facility” when the defendant
had used a cell phone to commit the underlying crime—a
misdemeanor purchase of cocaine—the Supreme Court noted that
“Congress legislates against a background assumption of
218
prosecutorial discretion.” The power to prosecute is the power to
219
make policy.
Substantial authority exists for the proposition that the power to
execute federal laws cannot be delegated to individuals entirely
220
outside the presidential chain of command. Printz v. United States
made this clear after the Court held that part of the Brady Handgun
221
Violence Prevention Act was unconstitutional because it delegated
discretionary enforcement authority to local law-enforcement
agencies: “The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to
administer the laws enacted by Congress; the President, it says, ‘shall
222
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” The Court held
that the Brady Act “effectively transfer[red] this responsibility to
thousands of [Chief Law Enforcement Officers] in the 50 States, who
are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential
control (if indeed meaningful Presidential control is possible without
223
the power to appoint and remove).”
Printz is controversial, but its application to the immigration
context is consistent with decisions that won wider support on the
224
Court. For example, Morrison v. Olson upheld the appointment of
218. Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2102, 2107 n.3 (2009); see also Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 296 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing “the policy goals and
competing enforcement priorities that attend any exercise of prosecutorial discretion”).
219. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV.
469, 475 (1996) (“Whenever Congress resorts to general statutory language . . . it necessarily
transfers lawmaking responsibility to courts (or prosecutors).”). This is equally true in the
context of immigration. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 2037, 2060–65 (2008) (discussing the discretionary nature of enforcing immigration
laws).
220. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
221. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, tit. I, 107 Stat. 1536,
1536–44 (1993).
222. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
223. Id.
224. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Justice Scalia dissented because he did not
believe that it was “for [the Court] to determine . . . how much of the purely executive powers of
government must be within the full control of the President. The Constitution prescribes that
they all are.” Id. at 709 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia drove home the power of his point
by using the powers of Congress as another example:
Is it conceivable that if Congress passed a statute depriving itself of less than full and
entire control over some insignificant area of legislation, we would inquire whether

CHIN IN PRINTER PROOF

2011]

10/13/2011 9:46:53 AM

STATE REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION

301

an independent counsel who was somewhat insulated from
presidential control, because the president retained the ability to
remove the counsel for good cause. The power of removal, although
circumscribed, led the Court to conclude that the structure was “not a
case in which the power to remove an executive official [had] been
completely stripped from the President, thus providing no means for
225
the President to ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws.”
In the 2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
226
Accounting Oversight Board, a five-Justice majority held that the
tenure provisions governing the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB), a subsidiary agency of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), were unconstitutional because
PCAOB commissioners could only be removed for good cause by the
227
SEC. The dissenters did not deny that some presidential control
was required; rather, they argued that given the president’s influence
over the SEC, and further, given the SEC’s statutory control over the
PCAOB, “as a practical matter, the President’s control over the
228
Board should prove sufficient as well.”
In contrast to the chains of command analyzed in Morrison v.
Olson and Free Enterprise Fund, the president has absolutely no legal
or practical ability to influence the conduct of state prosecutors. State
prosecutors are neither appointed nor supervised by the president,
229
nor can they be removed by the president. State prosecutors,

the matter was “ so central to the functioning of the Legislative Branch” as really to
require complete control, or whether the statute gives Congress “sufficient control
over the surrogate legislator to ensure that Congress is able to perform its
constitutionally assigned duties”? Of course we would have none of that. Once we
determined that a purely legislative power was at issue we would require it to be
exercised, wholly and entirely, by Congress.
Id.
225. Id. at 692 (majority opinion).
226. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
227. Id. at 3153 (“The Act before us . . . . not only protects [PCAOB] Board members from
removal except for good cause, but withdraws from the President any decision on whether that
good cause exists. That decision is vested instead in other tenured officers—the [SEC]
Commissioners—none of whom is subject to the President’s direct control. The result is a Board
that is not accountable to the President, and a President who is not responsible for the Board.”).
228. Id. at 3173 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
229. For an example of state criminal independence from the federal executive, see Medellín
v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008), which held that the president has no authority to interfere with
executions achieved in violation of a U.S. treaty. Id. at 1353.
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therefore, almost certainly cannot exercise federal executive
230
authority.
The Department of Justice has an existing statutory mechanism
231
for making state prosecutors special assistant U.S. attorneys. Under
this scheme, states may choose to hire and pay assistant district
attorneys and volunteer them to work on federal cases, and the
Department of Justice can accept whatever prosecutorial resources
232
the states wish to provide. The United States is likely to decline
such an offer only if it does not want the help. So, for example, the
United States is likely to decline the offer of prosecutorial support
from state prosecutors if it has a policy reason for not bringing more
immigration prosecutions, rather than mere resource constraints. A
state interested in immigration prosecution is likely to turn down the
opportunity to support federal immigration enforcement only if, for
some reason, it does not want to follow the directions of the
president, the attorney general, and the officers appointed under
them. An end run around this mechanism, either by Congress or a
state, would seem to be aimed at undermining federal executive
discretion.
2. Executive Authority over Immigration. There is no question
that the president is entitled to execute federal immigration law just
like all other federal laws. When, in the mid-1990s, Arizona and other

230. To the extent that the text of § 287(g) agreements limits the power of ICE to terminate
the agreements themselves and to the extent that the agreements’ operation has in fact reflected
local, rather than federal, prosecution priorities, Free Enterprise Fund calls their
constitutionality into question. See RANDY CAPPS, MARC ROSENBLUM, CRISTINA RODRÍGUEZ
& MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND
LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1–4 (2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
pubs/287g-divergence.pdf (assessing the “implementation, enforcement outcomes, costs, and
community impacts of the 287(g) program”).
231. See 28 U.S.C. § 543 (2006) (“Special attorneys. (a) The Attorney General may appoint
attorneys to assist United States attorneys when the public interest so requires. (b) Each
attorney appointed under this section is subject to removal by the Attorney General.”); U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-11.242 (rev. ed. 1997), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam (describing the appointment
process in more detail).
232. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the W. Dist. of Mo., Seven Gang
Members Indicted for Crack Cocaine Conspiracy (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.justice
.gov/usao/mow/news2011/bifford.ind.html (“Under a partnership with the Jackson County
Prosecutor’s Office, a full-time Special Assistant U.S. Attorney has been designated to focus on
prosecuting gang-related crimes in federal court. ‘We are utilizing a federal grant in order to
make one of our assistant prosecutors available to prosecute gang-related cases in federal court,’
said Jackson County Prosecutor Jim Kanatzar.”).
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states sued the United States demanding that it more aggressively
enforce immigration laws, the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim. It
held, borrowing words from the Supreme Court, that “[a]n agency’s
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or
criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s
233
absolute discretion.”
Indeed, this general principle applies with special force to
immigration. For example, in United States ex rel. Knauff v.
234
Shaughnessy, the Court explained, “The exclusion of aliens is a
fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone
from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to
235
control the foreign affairs of the nation.” Similarly, in Hampton v.
236
Mow Sun Wong, the Supreme Court invalidated a U.S. Civil Service
Commission regulation excluding lawful permanent residents from
federal civil service: “[A]ssuming . . . that the national interests
identified by [the Commission] would adequately support an explicit
determination by Congress or the President to exclude all noncitizens
from the federal service, we conclude that those interests cannot
provide an acceptable rationalization for such a determination by the
237
Civil Service Commission.” Although technically a due-process
decision, the Court was clearly concerned about excessive
238
delegation.

233. California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original)
(quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Arizona’s suit was rejected for the same reason. Id. at 1089 n.1; Arizona v. United States, 104
F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 1997). See generally Motomura, supra note 219, at 2060–65 (discussing
the role of discretion in immigration law); Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2006) (same); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010) (same).
234. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
235. Id. at 542.
236. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
237. Id. at 116.
238. Id. (“Since these residents were admitted as a result of decisions made by the Congress
and the President, implemented by the [INS] acting under the Attorney General of the United
States, due process requires that the decision to impose that deprivation of an important liberty
be made either at a comparable level of government or, if it is to be permitted to be made by the
Civil Service Commission, that it be justified by reasons which are properly the concern of that
agency.” (footnote omitted)); cf. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN,
HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY 1246–60 (6th ed. 2008) (discussing the PRWORA, which “gave states new
authority to decide eligibility for jointly funded federal-state programs . . . and for state-funded
public benefits”).
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Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez explain that the
Knauff view has not been the Court’s only approach; sometimes the
Court seems to consider the regulation of immigration to be an
239
ordinary congressional power. Nevertheless, even assuming that the
president may not contradict or defy a particular congressional
direction, the Court understands that administration of the
immigration laws implicates foreign policy and national security in
240
ways in which other executive decisions might not.
Thus, in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
241
Committee, the Court rejected a claim of selective prosecution in
the immigration context. The Court explained the particular
difficulties with “invad[ing] a special province of the Executive—its
242
prosecutorial discretion” in the immigration context. As the Court
acknowledged, simply inquiring into the executive’s reasons for
prosecution could cause harm:
What will be involved in deportation cases is not merely the
disclosure of normal domestic law enforcement priorities and
techniques, but often the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives and
(as in this case) foreign-intelligence products and techniques. The
Executive should not have to disclose its ‘real’ reasons . . . and even
if it did disclose them a court would be ill equipped to determine
243
their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their adequacy.

Accordingly, if Congress authorized states to regulate immigration by
passing and carrying out their own laws, or by carrying out existing
federal laws, it would not only be delegating power assigned by the
Constitution to the president, but it would also be impermissibly
invading the areas of foreign affairs and national security.

239. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE
L.J. 458, 476–78 (2009).
240. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005) (“To infer an
absolute rule of acceptance where Congress has not clearly set it forth would run counter to our
customary policy of deference to the President in matters of foreign affairs. Removal decisions,
including the selection of a removed alien’s destination, ‘may implicate our relations with
foreign powers’ and require consideration of ‘changing political and economic circumstances.’”
(quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976))).
241. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
242. Id. at 489.
243. Id. at 490–91.
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C. Sovereign Interests of the United States
244

In the 1879 decision in Tennessee v. Davis, the Supreme Court
stated that “there can be no criminal prosecution initiated in any
State court for that which is merely an offence against the general
245
government.” This concept is derived from a line of cases holding
that states cannot prosecute, even under generally applicable criminal
statutes, offenses affecting only the sovereign interests of the United
States.
The Court has frequently characterized deportation and other
246
aspects of immigration as sovereign federal powers. Over fifty years
ago, the Court stated that this principle was too deeply established to
be reconsidered: “[T]hat the formulation of [policies pertaining to the
entry of aliens and their right to remain here] is entrusted exclusively
to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative
and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our
247
government.” Because immigration—both entry and departure—
involves human beings crossing a national border, it seems to
constitute “commerce with foreign nations, confided by the
248
Constitution to the exclusive control of Congress.” Thus, only
Congress can create crimes involving the admission, exclusion, and
removal of noncitizens.
The concept of exclusive jurisdiction is inconsistent with the idea
that it can be ceded involuntarily or implicitly when another

244. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879).
245. Id. at 262. Davis is discussed in Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties,
and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 39, 96–97. Cf. United States v. Frade, 709
F.2d 1387, 1402 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that the president does not have the power to create
immigration law by executive order and stating that “[t]his is especially true when the power is
exercised in the imposition of a criminal sanction upon persons in the United States, a matter
normally within the congressional domain”).
246. E.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (“[C]ontrol over matters of
immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the Executive and the
Legislature.”); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S.
442, 456 (1977) (recognizing the “power over immigration” as one of the “sovereign powers that
are inherently in the exclusive domain of the Federal Government and critical to its very
existence”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“[T]his Court has in the
past sustained deportation as an exercise of the sovereign’s power to determine the conditions
upon which an alien may reside in this country.”); Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 556 (1913)
(“[S]overeign states [such as the United States] have inherent power to deport aliens . . . .”).
247. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 455–
56 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting the same passage from Galvan).
248. New York v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 60 (1883).
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jurisdiction wants to help. In Puerto Rico v. Koedel, the First Circuit
held that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico had not acquired de
facto concurrent jurisdiction over a public portion of a military base
that was under de jure exclusive federal jurisdiction through local
cooperation and use. The majority explained, “[W]e are aware of no
theory, and neither the appellee nor the district court has cited any,
under which exclusive jurisdiction can be implicitly transformed into
concurrent jurisdiction through actions other than legislative
250
intervention.”
States prosecuting within exclusive federal, tribal, or military
jurisdictions—or, for that matter, the federal government or tribes
prosecuting within exclusive state jurisdiction—might indeed be
251
“reinforcing the efforts” of the “law enforcement agencies” with
exclusive jurisdiction. It may be that the government entity without
252
jurisdiction would act with “identical purposes” to those of the
government with exclusive jurisdiction. But throughout Supreme
Court and lower state and federal court decisions, no court has
inquired into whether the body with no authority was acting
congenially or otherwise.
Exclusive jurisdiction is exclusive because the Constitution
makes it so. “The test . . . is not whether the state legislation is in
conflict with the details of the Federal law or supplements it, but
whether the State had any jurisdiction of a subject over which
253
Congress had exerted its exclusive control.” As the Court explained
254
in 1884 in the Head Money Cases, using language that could easily
have been written in 2011,
This court has decided distinctly and frequently . . . that [the power
to regulate immigration] does not belong to the States. That decision
did not rest in any case on the ground that the State and its people
were not deeply interested in the existence and enforcement of such

249. Puerto Rico v. Koedel, 927 F.2d 662 (1st Cir. 1991).
250. Id. at 666. The court further cited Fort Leavenworth Railroad v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525
(1885), which quoted and followed the rule of a New York case that had held that “the rights of
sovereignty [are] not to be taken away by implication.” Id. at 538 (citing People v. Godfrey, 17
Johns. 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819)).
251. Kobach, Reinforcing, supra note 16, at 475.
252. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on
other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
253. S. Ry. v. R.R. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 439, 448 (1915).
254. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
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laws, and were not capable of enforcing them if they had the power
to enact them; but on the ground that the Constitution, in the
division of powers which it declares between the States and the
general government, has conferred this power on the latter to the
255
exclusion of the former.

Federal criminal jurisdiction may be exclusive even when
substantive state law applies through the Assimilative Crimes Act
256
(ACA). If states were to help enforce federal criminal law in any
setting, the jurisdiction that falls within the ACA would seem to be
the most appropriate, because states are experts in interpreting and
applying their own law. But, as the Arizona Supreme Court explained
in affirming a grant of habeas corpus, although “[b]y enactment of the
[ACA,] . . . Congress expressly adopted the criminal laws of the
States[,]” nonetheless, “federal jurisdiction over offenses, either
felonies or misdemeanors, committed by an Indian in Indian country
257
is exclusive and not concurrent with state jurisdiction.”
The Supreme Court has directly ruled that states may not
criminalize conduct within the exclusive criminal authority of the
federal government. The principle from Tennessee v. Davis that
“there can be no criminal prosecution initiated in any State court for
258
that which is merely an offense against the general government”
259
applies even under a generally applicable state criminal law. In the

255. Id. at 591.
256. Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006). Section 13(a) of title 18 of the U.S.
Code provides that conduct that
would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State,
Territory, Possession, or District in which such place [of federal jurisdiction] is
situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be
guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.
Id. § 13(a). But such “statutes, of course, do not confer any regulatory or enforcement
jurisdiction on the States.” Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 742 n.5 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see, e.g., Harbin v. State, 581 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that
although a local officer could “make an arrest on [reservation territory,] . . . . an escape from the
custody of an arrest which occurred on the [reservation] is a federal offense which must be
prosecuted in federal court and not in state court”); State v. Allan, 607 P.2d 426, 434 (Idaho
1980) (“To allow the state of Idaho to assert criminal jurisdiction over a person of substantial
Quinault Indian blood, duly enrolled in that tribe, who has not been shown to have taken any
steps to achieve emancipation . . . would be to encroach . . . on the domain of federal law.”);
Arquette v. Schneckloth, 351 P.2d 921, 925 (Wash. 1960) (en banc) (“[J]urisdiction over crimes
committed by Indians in Indian country . . . remain[s] in the federal courts.”).
257. In re Denetclaw, 320 P.2d 697, 700 (Ariz. 1958) (affirming a grant of habeas corpus).
258. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 262 (1879).
259. Of course, many things, like robbery of a federally chartered bank, will be within the
state’s police power as breaches of the peace or the like.
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1890 decision in In re Loney, the Court held that, although allegedly
perjured statements had occurred before a Virginia notary in that
state, Virginia could not prosecute under its own perjury statute
because the statements had been made for use in a federal forum:
A witness who gives his testimony . . . in a case pending in a court or
other judicial tribunal of the United States . . . is accountable for the
truth of his testimony to the United States only; and perjury
committed in so testifying is an offence against the public justice of
the United States and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States; and cannot, therefore, be punished in the
260
courts of Virginia under . . . her statutes . . . .

As a U.S. district judge explained in 1875, even if a prosecution is
nominally based on a state statute, “the state courts cannot hold
criminal jurisdiction over offences exclusively existing as offences
against the United States; for every criminal prosecution must charge
the crime to have been committed against the sovereign whose courts
sit in judgment upon the offender, and whose authority can pardon
261
him.” Justice Bradley, while riding circuit, affirmed: “It would be a
manifest incongruity for one sovereignty to punish a person for an
262
offense committed against the laws of another sovereignty.”
These ideas continue to appear in modern cases. In 1975, the
Arizona Court of Appeals held that Arizona’s perjury statute could
not be used to prosecute an alleged false statement that had been
made in federal court. The court explained, “If there is to be any
prosecution for the alleged wrongful acts set out in these counts, such
263
prosecution must come from Federal authorities.”
The California Court of Appeals applied this same principle in
264
2008 to an immigration offense. In People v. Hassan, the defendant
was convicted under a California fraud statute for providing false
documents to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
265
(ICE) “in connection with a federal immigration investigation.”
The court noted that “[s]everal federal laws potentially criminalize
the presentation of false or fraudulent documents in connection with

260. In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372, 375 (1890).
261. Ex parte Bridges, 4 F. Cas. 98, 100–01 (N.D. Ga.) (No. 1862), aff’d, 4 F. Cas. 98
(C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No. 1862).
262. Ex parte Bridges, 4 F. Cas. 98, 105 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No. 1862).
263. State v. Warren, 539 P.2d 184, 186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
264. People v. Hassan, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 314 (Ct. App. 2008).
265. Id. at 323.

CHIN IN PRINTER PROOF

2011]

10/13/2011 9:46:53 AM

STATE REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION

309

266

[such an] investigation.” The court reversed the conviction, holding
that state law was inapplicable:
That avoids a construction in which the federal criminal law is
simply enforced by the state law. Because the documents appellant
provided I.C.E. were produced pursuant to the laws of the United
States which was the sole source of authorization for the I.C.E.
investigation, the integrity of the federal proceeding is protected by
267
the federal law.

Of course, states have jurisdiction over many of the things that
noncitizens do, including conduct that may be coincidentally related
to immigration. It is conceivable that, in connection with any given
episode of transporting noncitizens, an individual might commit other
criminal offenses, such as kidnapping, extortion, assault, or rape.
Those offenses would ordinarily fall within state jurisdiction even if
they happened to involve noncitizens.
But states do not have a direct regulatory interest in
immigration, even when it involves undocumented noncitizens. The
critical question with respect to a state statute modeled after federal
law is whether states have the power to affect immigration somewhat
less directly, by punishing those who transport immigrants and are
thus accomplices, or by punishing those who misprision the crime by
concealing immigrants. Some situations exist in which the auxiliary
regulation serves an independent purpose, as in the case of statutes
that prohibit eluding police in a motor vehicle: the chase presents a
public safety risk even if the driver is not guilty of the offense that led
to the attempted stop. But the federal transportation and concealing
266. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (2006)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324c
(declaring it unlawful to “forge . . . any document for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of
[the INA]”); 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (punishing “[w]hoever knowingly forges” an immigration
document “for the purpose of satisfying a requirement” under the INA).
267. Id. at 323–24; cf. Van Stuyvesant v. Conway, No. 03 Civ. 3856(LAK), 2007 WL 2584775,
at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (noting—in the course of holding that the state had jurisdiction
over charges of larceny, fraud, and impersonating an attorney, even though the charges involved
deception of people involved in immigration proceedings—that “it appears that Petitioner is
confusing immigration law matters, over which the federal government retains exclusive
jurisdiction, for the crimes he was convicted of in this case, all of which were crimes under New
York State law”); People v. Bilus, 804 N.Y.S.2d 670, 674 (Dist. Ct. 2005) (holding that the New
York crime of obstructing governmental administration does not apply to the obstruction of
federal employees); People v. Arvio, 321 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (J. Ct. 1971) (holding that the New
York crime of obstructing governmental administration could not be premised on interference
with the federal Selective Service System and stating that “[i]t is clear that Congress intended
the federal courts exclusively to take jurisdiction of violations of the act and [that] on this
ground the informations must be dismissed”).
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statutes do not seem to address interests other than regulating
undocumented immigration. Accordingly, state copies seem to be
impermissibly concerned with the same end as federal immigration
provisions.
268
The Court’s 1821 decision in Cohens v. Virginia suggests that
the inability to punish a direct offense dictates an inability to punish
aiders and abettors, accomplices, and accessories: “It is clear, that
Congress cannot punish felonies generally; and, of consequence,
269
cannot punish misprision of felony” except in the particular areas in
which the United States has jurisdiction to punish both. Applying
Cohens to other examples of exclusive federal jurisdiction seems to
lead to the same result for two reasons, one principled and one
practical.
The principled reason is that the wrong remains solely against
the laws of the United States, not against those of any individual
state. The Constitution prohibits states from criminalizing, variously,
270
sedition against the United States, the taking of deposits by national
271
banks with more liabilities than assets, or disciplinary misconduct
272
within the U.S. military. The question, then, is whether states are
also prohibited from criminalizing, say, transportation for the
purposes of doing those things. Because the reason for states’
inability to regulate is constitutional—the wrongs are solely within
the jurisdiction of the United States—states should be likewise
disabled from prosecuting accomplices, conspirators, and aiders and
abettors. The point is not, say, that people have a right to commit or
to help commit sedition against the United States; sedition remains a
273
crime. It is only that, whether the defendant is prosecuted as a
principal or as an accomplice, the legal interest is solely that of the
United States.
The practical reason is that the exception would swallow the rule.
If states were allowed to pass criminal laws in areas of exclusive
federal jurisdiction on any theory other than that of the principal
268. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
269. Id. at 428.
270. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956).
271. Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 230–31 (1903).
272. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; see also 10 U.S.C. § 889 (2006) (“Any person subject to
this chapter who behaves with disrespect toward his superior commissioned officer shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct.”). For a discussion of exclusive military jurisdiction of
purely military offenses, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
273. 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (2006).
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acting alone, any limitation on state authority would be practically
eliminated. For example, even a sole principal will often have
engaged in transportation for purposes of facilitating an act of
disrespect of a superior officer by driving to the base. In addition,
because accessorial liability is a universal part of criminal law, either
by general or by special statute, exclusive power in a particular area
must include exclusivity with respect to its normal incidents.
Exclusive jurisdiction cannot have such an easy and broad loophole.
The police power is not implicated by state efforts to regulate
immigration through criminal law other than by regulating areas of
274
exclusively federal interest. Imagine lawfully admitted immigrants
traveling by automobile from Albuquerque, New Mexico, to Dallas,
Texas; in Dallas, they plan to buy food and rent lodging. The driver is
licensed, the car is registered, and traffic laws are obeyed. The car is
free of drugs, weapons, and other contraband; the occupants commit
no breach of the peace. Texas could not criminalize the presence or
travel of those people based on lack of citizenship; not only would
such a state crime be inconsistent with federal immigration law, but
the occupants have engaged in no acts or omissions within the police
power of the state to regulate.
Changing the hypothetical to make the individuals
undocumented does not alter the absence of a basis for regulation
under the police power, apart from the impermissible desire to
regulate immigration itself. And again, as Chief Justice Burger
explained in Plyler, “A state has no power to prevent unlawful
immigration, and no power to deport illegal aliens; those powers are
275
reserved exclusively to Congress and the Executive.” To be sure,
the Plyler majority acknowledged that it could be relevant that the
children were undocumented: “The State may borrow the federal
classification. But to justify its use as a criterion for its own
discriminatory policy, the State must demonstrate that the
classification is reasonably adapted to ‘the purposes for which the
276
state desires to use it.’”

274. Of course, other crimes could be committed while transporting an undocumented
noncitizen, but that speculative possibility is not enough to warrant state regulation any more
than the possibility of additional crimes outside a statute in any other area of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. In any event, if there are any crimes that actually fall within the police power,
individuals who commit those crimes can be charged without regulating immigration itself.
275. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 n.1 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 226 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 664–65 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring)).
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To criminalize the otherwise-lawful transportation of otherwiselaw-abiding people, the state must pinpoint precisely how
undocumented status is related to a legitimate state interest other
277
than the desire to regulate immigration. In the absence of any
permissible end other than keeping undocumented people out, the
police power justifies such regulation only if it permits states to
regulate immigration directly. A premise of the mirror-image theory,
consistent with existing law, is that the police power does not.
In sum, centuries of federal statutes and case law—and the
nature of the Constitution and sovereignty itself—instruct the states
and the national government to enact and prosecute only those
crimes that lie within their sovereign authority. That one government
enacts a law within its exclusive jurisdiction does not enlarge the
278
constitutional authority of the other.
CONCLUSION
Why has American law generally rejected the proposition that
279
states have the power to prosecute federal crimes in state courts?

277. Of course, a state may wish to regulate national banks, active-duty military personnel,
or immigration for ends within the police power, such as improving its economy. But a
legitimate end cannot justify the impermissible means of invading an exclusive federal power.
For example, ill-disciplined members of the U.S. Air Force could make it less likely that a
particular base would get a particular assignment that could be of great economic interest to the
civilian population. But even to protect its economy, a state may not impose its own version of
military discipline on these federal servicemen, nor may it more vigorously enforce provisions of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice than the military chooses to.
278. Several Justices have passionately contended that even the government’s giving up
power is irrelevant to the constitutional question. Justice Thomas has explained that it does not
matter whether amici States welcome federal support, particularly financial, for the detention of
“sexually dangerous persons”: “Congress’ power . . . is fixed by the Constitution; it does not
expand merely to suit the States’ policy preferences, or to allow State officials to avoid difficult
choices regarding the allocation of state funds.” United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949,
1982 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Similarly, in Zschernig v. Miller, Justice Stewart argued that the acquiescence of the
solicitor general to a state’s exercise of the foreign-affairs power is irrelevant:
We deal here with the basic allocation of power between the States and the Nation.
Resolution of so fundamental a constitutional issue cannot vary . . . with the shifting
winds at the State Department. . . . [T]he fact remains that the conduct of our foreign
affairs is entrusted under the Constitution to the National Government, not to the
probate courts of the several States.
Id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
279. See generally Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature
of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 8–12 (1996) (describing the constitutional
limitations that prevent states from prosecuting federal crimes); Charles Warren, Federal
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Early in the nation’s history, the answer to this question turned in
part on the battles between federalists, who wanted more expansive
federal courts with more sweeping jurisdiction, and antifederalists,
who wanted to cabin federal power generally and supported the use
280
of state courts to try federal as well as state claims. Although the
allocation of powers between the federal government and the states
remains a vital topic, the theory and practice of federalism has
increasingly come to recognize the “polyphony” of overlapping and
281
intertwined power and action on many topics.
Modern federalism theorists have spent relatively little time
focusing on the criminal law. The leading article on the question of
whether federal crimes should be enforceable in the states continues
282
to be an article written in 1925 by Professor Charles Warren. Yet
the new initiative to increase state enforcement of immigrationrelated laws, and, in particular, the claim that states have the
authority to do so in support of federal law, has brought these more
general questions to the fore.
Setting immigration law and policy remains a uniquely national
power. Although many immigration laws have passed under the
bridge since 1876, the central holdings of Henderson and Chy Lung
remain fully relevant today. The federal government can, and does,
work with the states. Authorizing states to assist with immigration
enforcement under the supervision of federal authorities may be good
or bad immigration policy. It may be nationally consistent or
inconsistent. But the decision to make such an authorization is a
choice that stems from, and that should be left within, federal control.
None of this is to say that states are entirely prohibited from
regulating noncitizens. Indeed, they have some authority to do so as
long as they do not attempt to regulate immigration itself. Inevitably,
this distinction will lead to close questions. But even when regulating
immigrants and not immigration, states must rely solely on their own

Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545 (1925) (reviewing the nineteenthcentury experience with vesting some federal criminal jurisdiction in state courts).
280. For a discussion of the historical development of federal criminal jurisdiction, see
Kurland, supra note 279, at 61–82.
281. See generally ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009) (arguing that polyphonic federalism is more
efficient, democratic, and protective of liberties than other forms).
282. See supra note 279 and accompanying text. For a more recent take on the same issue,
see Collins & Nash, supra note 216.
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regulatory justifications and their own sovereign interests, both of
which will be tested for consistency with federal authority.
Under the prevailing legal doctrine, the criminal provisions of SB
1070 and similar provisions in other states cannot stand on the mirrorimage theory. Nor could they stand if the State of Arizona tried to
prosecute federal laws directly in state courts. These new state crimes
would be valid only if the states could persuade the Supreme Court
that states have the inherent authority to regulate immigration with
respect to undocumented noncitizens. Such an outcome would be a
dramatic reversal of the Court’s immigration jurisprudence
establishing federal power over immigration as supreme, which so far
has proved invulnerable.

